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BENIGN  PARTISANSHIP
Franita Tolson*
The Framers of the United States Constitution created our system of feder-
alism based on the principle that political safeguards would protect the regula-
tory interests of the states from overreaching by the federal government.  While
many of these safeguards have since failed, others have emerged to insulate the
states from an ever-expanding federal presence.  One such safeguard is partisan
gerrymandering, which allows states to draw legislative districts that reflect the
partisan affiliation of a majority of the electorate, and in turn, send a delega-
tion to Congress that is as ideologically cohesive as practicable.  In making this
argument, this Article corrects a basic misunderstanding in the political safe-
guards literature: that the Senate is the only chamber that the Framers con-
structed to protect state interests.  In reality, a politically cohesive House
delegation can ensure that the state’s preferred policy preferences shape federal
lawmaking.
This Article also illustrates that, in the context of congressional redistrict-
ing, the legal scholarship’s sole focus on ascertaining manageable judicial stan-
dards ignores the concerns about institutional legitimacy and judicially
dictated political outcomes that are exacerbated by the federalism issues in this
area.  Despite the absence of standards, the broader structural implications of
promoting “federalism-reinforcing” gerrymandering require the Supreme Court
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to craft rules that encourage the use of mid-decade redistricting and at-large
voting schemes; that limit the authority of independent commissions to draw
redistricting plans; and that promote strong state political parties, all of which
will help preserve the states’ ability to utilize the federalism benefits that flow
from partisan redistricting.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution is a complex allocation of checks
and balances, designed to reduce politics to competition between the
branches and levels of government, and in the process, eliminate the
need for political parties in our system.1  Yet political parties emerged
soon after ratification, rendering the checks and balances that the
Framers hoped would stymie faction obsolete, and turning every
aspect of our electoral system, from adopting legislation to con-
ducting elections, into political endeavors centered on competition
between the two major political parties.
Redistricting has emerged as the most political of these endeav-
ors, in part because of a concept that received its name shortly after
ratification: partisan gerrymandering.2  As a country, we have strug-
gled to control the partisanship that occurs in the redistricting pro-
cess, viewing it as a boogeyman that seeks to perpetuate the power of a
select few at the expense of the many.  Even when the lines are drawn
by a nonpartisan commission,3 a special master,4 the courts,5 or a
1 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); Daryl J.
Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312,
2313 (2006).
2 Generally, a partisan gerrymander is where a single party draws lines to maxi-
mize its seat share, GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER:
THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 31 (2002), but
even a bipartisan gerrymander, where both parties draw districts to protect incum-
bents, is designed to maximize each party’s seat share. Id. at 32 (“Each party likes to
have more seats rather than fewer, and each is risk averse.  Each makes a strategic
decision regarding how much bias and how much responsiveness its ideal redistrict-
ing plan would have and then bargains with the other in an attempt to attain or
approximate that ideal.”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (9th ed. 2009) (“[A
partisan, or political, gerrymander is t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into
electoral districts, often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair
advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.”).
3 See Damon Eris, California’s Not So Non-Partisan Redistricting, INDEPENDENT
VOTER NETWORK (June 6, 2011), http://ivn.us/2011/06/01/californias-not-so-non-
partisan-redistricting/; see also D.J. Rossiter et al., The Partisan Impacts of Non-Partisan
Redistricting: Northern Ireland 1993-95, in 23 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF BRITISH
GEOGRAPHERS 455 (1998) (arguing that non-partisan processes are conducted in a
partisan manner and result in partisan outcomes).
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major political party,6 the process can become infected by partisan
bias.7
By implication, the judicial review of partisan gerrymandering is
inescapably intertwined with the political nature of the redistricting
process, giving any decisions a certain taint, a “dirtiness” that is typi-
cally associated with politics.8  For this reason, a plurality of the
Supreme Court wants to render partisan gerrymandering claims non-
justiciable,9 but perhaps, as some scholars argue, we need the courts
to serve as a gatekeeper of sorts, to keep the partisanship from com-
promising both the interests of the voters and the efficacy of the elec-
toral system as a whole.
Despite these conflicting propositions, the question of jus-
ticiability cannot be resolved without appropriate consideration of a
fact that has been overlooked by both the legal scholarship and the
courts: that the process of congressional redistricting is a political safe-
guard that helps insulate the states’ regulatory authority from federal
overreaching.  The Framers devised the House of Representatives to
give citizens a voice in the new government and, along with the Sen-
ate, to protect the states.10  This latter role is fulfilled when states draw
districts for their House delegations, allowing states to influence not
only who serves, but also what policies will be promoted on the
4 See J. Morgan Kousser, Estimating the Partisan Consequences of Redistricting Plans—
Simply, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 521, 529–31 (1996).
5 See COX & KATZ, supra note 2, at 60 (“[In the early reapportionment cases,] R
which party had a majority on the court hearing a case systematically affected the
levels of bias attained by the corresponding plan . . . .”).
6 See, e.g., Texas Democrats Flee to Neighboring State to Avoid Redistricting Vote, VOICE
OF AMERICA (May 15, 2003), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-a-2003-05-
15-27-Texas-67309472.html.
7 See, e.g., COX & KATZ, supra note 2, at 20 (“In plurality-rule elections, the larg- R
est vote-getting party generally gets a higher percentage of seats than votes, even when
districts are established by bipartisan commissions and partisan gerrymandering is
unlikely.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)); ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC
REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 462 (1968) (“To be brutally
frank, whether or not there is a gerrymander in design, there normally will be some
gerrymander in result as a concomitant of all district systems of legislative election.”
(emphasis omitted)).
8 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
9 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding
that Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), which found partisan gerrymandering
claims to be justiciable, should be overturned because of a lack of manageable
standards).
10 See infra Part II.
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national stage.11  As I have argued elsewhere, partisan gerrymander-
ing is a safeguard of federalism because states can create safe, partisan
districts pursuant to their power under the Elections Clause, and use
this redistricting authority as leverage to influence their congressional
delegations and in turn, federal policy, in ways favorable to their inter-
ests.12  In order to properly account for this federalism interest, I offer
a new perspective on the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering
claims, a perspective that also has broader implications for federalism
doctrine and judicial review more generally.
In this Article, I argue that the partisan gerrymandering of con-
gressional districts is not suitable for direct judicial regulation because
courts cannot adequately value its federalism benefits in the already
complicated manageable standards inquiry.  Nevertheless, both the
courts and the legal scholarship must take heed of the fact that the
federalism implications of partisan gerrymandering influence the
11 The states’ power over federal elections is considered one of the “political safe-
guards of federalism,” which are the different structural mechanisms in the Constitu-
tion that give the states a role in the composition of the federal government and allow
states to protect themselves from overreaching by the federal government. THE FED-
ERALIST NO. 45, at 236 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). As Madison noted:
Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the
United States cannot be elected at all.  They must in all cases have a great
share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves
determine it.  The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the
State legislatures.  Even the House of Representatives, though drawn imme-
diately from the people, will be chosen very much under the influence of
that class of men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an
election into the State legislatures.
Id. The central provision that gives states their power over elections is the Elections
Clause, which provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
12 See Erik J. Engstrom, Stacking the States, Stacking the House: The Partisan Conse-
quences of Congressional Redistricting in the 19th Century, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 419
(2006) (arguing that states used gerrymandering during the nineteenth century to
affect the composition of state congressional delegations and on several occasions,
gerrymandering determined which party controlled the House of Representatives);
Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REV.
859 (2010) (exploring the federalism implications of the states’ ability, pursuant to
the Elections Clause, to redistrict based on partisan considerations); see also Nathaniel
Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incum-
bent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002) (arguing that partisan gerry-
mandering is unobjectionable because it will allow states to send an experienced and
senior delegation to Congress which accurately reflects the underlying partisan com-
position of the electorate).
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scope of judicial review with regards to other substantive areas of law.
Notably, the lack of manageable standards does not deprive the
Supreme Court of its responsibility to guarantee that its broader juris-
prudence does not undercut the ability of states to use their constitu-
tionally mandated redistricting authority in a federalism reinforcing
way.  Along these lines, the focus of this Article is less about determin-
ing whether judicial review is desirable, or ascertaining what the gov-
erning standards for partisan gerrymandering claims should be;
instead, this Article seeks to redefine the role of the Court in regulat-
ing politics by taking the long view of what the structural implications
of partisan gerrymandering mean for the judicial review of politics
more generally.
In making this argument, this Article bridges the gap between the
election law and federalism literatures, both of which tend to ignore
or minimize the link between federalism as a framework for diffusing
power among the dual sovereigns and the electoral rules that facilitate
this process by giving the states a role in the composition of the fed-
eral government.13  Recognizing this link provides a sounder theoreti-
cal basis for understanding how power is shared and distributed
between the states and the federal government, and how our electoral
system reinforces the connection (and competition) between the two
levels of government.
The 2003 mid-decade redistricting of Texas’s congressional dis-
tricts provides a concrete example of the intersection between federal-
ism and election law.  After the 2000 census, Texas instituted a court-
ordered redistricting plan because of a deadlock in the legislature, but
in 2003, after the Republicans gained control of both houses, they re-
redistricted both the state legislative districts and the congressional
districts.  The Supreme Court, in League of United Latin American Citi-
zens v. Perry (hereinafter LULAC v. Perry or LULAC), held that the mid-
decade character of the 2003 plan, which the plaintiffs argued was
solely motivated by partisan gain, did not violate the Constitution.14
Indeed, the plan was largely reflective of the fact that the Republican
Party had a large majority in both the electorate and the state govern-
ment by 2002; unrecognized by the Court, however, is that sending a
congressional delegation that reflects this majority is a rough proxy
13 In the federalism literature, the states’ power over redistricting is erroneously
discounted as a political safeguard, see, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 226 (2000), and the
election law literature simultaneously overlooks the federalism potential of redistrict-
ing in advocating for strict judicial regulation of gerrymanders, see, e.g., Samuel
Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 614 (2002).
14 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
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for ensuring that Texas’s state interests are represented nationally.15
Partisan congruence between the electorate, the state leadership, and
the congressional delegation arguably has value in promoting the
state’s interests at the national level.16
15 Generally speaking, much of the legal and political science literature focuses
on the ambitions of officeholders in promoting policy, which implies that there are
no “state interests.”  In reality, the “state” does have institutional interests that are
separate and distinct from the ambitions of its elected officials, and I use the prefer-
ences of a majority of the voters as a rough proxy for “state interests.”  I have settled
on this definition because of the general sense that the state exists for the benefit of
its residents, elected officials work on behalf of these residents, and voter preferences
therefore should be paramount. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 51 (James Madison)
(Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (arguing that the role of representative government is to
“refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a cho-
sen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interests of their coun-
try”).  Despite their personal preferences, however, elected officials still promote the
interests of the voters and of the state as an institution in advocating for policy. See
JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS
IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 26 (2009) (“[A]mbitious officials within institutions gen-
erally recognize that the way to advance within the institution is to learn and internal-
ize the interests of the institution and to promote them effectively.”). See also Tashjian
v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (equating the views of the
state with those of the majority party).  I recognize that, in some situations, the prefer-
ences of the median voter rather than a majority of the electorate may be a better
gauge of “state interests,” but given the present state of polarization in our electorate,
it is contestable whether the median voter would better capture the preferences of the
electorate than a majoritarian norm.  Indeed, in many cases, the preferences of the
median voter and the majority of the electorate actually converge. See Elisabeth R.
Gerber & Jeffrey B. Lewis, Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and
Political Representation, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1364, 1376 (2004) (arguing that a legislator’s
behavior is constrained by the median in their district where the district is homoge-
nous; where a district is heterogeneous, the legislator’s behavior is dictated by party
affiliation).  Nonetheless, I recognize that there are limitations to relying on the pref-
erences of the majority. See Tolson, supra note 12 (conceding that the federalism
benefits of a gerrymander may be limited in a state where voter support is evenly split
between the two parties or where there is a bipartisan gerrymander).  I also recognize
that relying on majoritarian norms could potentially undermine the interests of
minority voters within the state, a concern that I address in Part III.B.1.a and Part
III.B.1.b, infra.
16 See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 419.  As Justice Kennedy observed:
Plan 1374C can be seen as making the party balance more congruent to
statewide party power.  To be sure, there is no constitutional requirement of
proportional representation, and equating a party’s statewide share of the
vote with its portion of the congressional delegation is a rough measure at
best.  Nevertheless, a congressional plan that more closely reflects the distri-
bution of state party power seems a less likely vehicle for partisan discrimina-
tion than one that entrenches an electoral minority.
Id.
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Thus, those debating the question of whether constitutional
claims of partisan gerrymandering should be justiciable have to con-
sider the federalism benefits that emerge from the gerrymandering of
congressional districts, whether the Court can properly value this ben-
efit, and the broader implications of promoting this type of gerryman-
dering in our system.  The LULAC plurality implicitly acknowledged
that there was some intrinsic value in having the state’s congressional
delegation mirror the distribution of power statewide but fell short of
explicitly ascribing any federalism benefits to the redistricting plan.17
Indeed, in the view of some of the Justices, the need for a more accu-
rate distribution of political power did little to validate the state’s par-
tisan decision to re-redistrict mid-decade.18
Much of their recalcitrance stems from the Court’s cabined view
of partisan gerrymandering as solely an “election law” issue.  Part I
challenges this assumption and situates partisan gerrymandering in
the federalism literature, which helps to reorient the discussion and
better resolve the issues surrounding institutional competency and
standards that have been the focal point for election law scholars.
The federalism debate has been fixated on restoring the balance of
power between the states and the federal government, with an equal
focus on whether the Court is capable of policing the boundary
between the two spheres.19  This section reveals how partisan gerry-
mandering, as an “extra-constitutional safeguard” of federalism, can
17 See id.; cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (holding that pro-
portional representation of political groups is a legitimate redistricting goal).
18 See, e.g., LULAC, 548 U.S. at 457–61 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that it is unlawful for a state to redraw its line for purely
partisan gain when it was under no legal obligation to do so); see also Vieth v. Jube-
lirer, 541 U.S. 267, 346–355 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that gerryman-
dering can be addressed by allowing plaintiffs to make district specific claims, an
approach that would undervalue the state interests and levels of party strength that
are factored into the redistricting plan in its entirety and make every district subject to
constitutional challenge).  Justice Breyer’s approach may have some success because it
looks for minority entrenchment, but because he assesses partisan abuse on a contin-
uum, his test would not accurately value the federalism benefit of the plan and could
result in at least some pro-federalism gerrymanders being invalidated. See id. at 365
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  Indeed, none of the proposed tests can delineate good from
bad politics. See id. at 299 (majority opinion) (criticizing the dissenters on this point).
19 Prominent scholars have championed the view that the Court’s federalism
jurisprudence should restore the original balance of power between the state and the
federal government as much as practicable.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1224–28 (1993); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism
Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1733, 1738 (2005).
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help shift the balance, which has long been pro-federal government,
back in favor of the states.20
Part II discusses how the view of partisan gerrymandering as a
federalism tool is consistent with the constitutional text and history,
both of which reveal that the Senate was not the only entity that the
Framers intended to protect state interests.  The House is also sup-
posed to play a role in ensuring that the states’ interests are ade-
quately represented in Congress, which is achieved through the states’
authority over redistricting.  States can advance these interests by
sending a House delegation to Congress that is as cohesive as practica-
ble to influence federal policy.
Part III explores how the debate over manageable standards is
significantly more complicated than once assumed because of the fed-
eralism implications of partisan gerrymandering.21  It concludes that,
despite the absence of standards, the broader implications of this
argument force the Court to reconsider its approach in at least three
areas: the use of mid-decade redistricting and at-large election
schemes, the delegation of redistricting authority to independent
commissions, and the regulation of state political parties.  In particu-
lar, increased mid-decade redistricting, like the 2003 Texas plan,
could help promote the federalism benefits of gerrymandering by
ensuring that the partisan affiliation of the congressional delegation
continues to parallel that of the electorate.  In contrast, redistricting
conducted by independent commissions instead of elected officials
from sufficiently independent state parties could undermine this ben-
efit.  A “nonpartisan” plan drawn by an independent commission
could result in a delegation that is not optimally constructed to pro-
mote the state’s interests because of the disconnect between the com-
mission, elected officials, and the electorate.  Protecting the
federalism benefits of gerrymandering may require the Court to
approach these substantive areas differently, even if it is unable to
construct standards that regulate partisan gerrymandering directly.
I. PROMOTING THE “BALANCE” OF FEDERALISM: EXTRA-
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE
Partisan gerrymandering sits at an uncomfortable crossroads
between two substantial literatures—election law, which usually
focuses on the existence of manageable standards and issues sur-
20 The term “extra-constitutional” safeguard is borrowed from Larry Kramer, who
argues that political parties are safeguards of federalism and refers to them as “extra-
constitutional” institutions. See Kramer, supra note 13, at 224. R
21 See generally Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2004).
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rounding justiciability,22 and the political safeguards literature, the
thrust of which is whether federalism issues should be subject to judi-
cial review or left to the political process.23  In Partisan Gerrymandering
as a Safeguard of Federalism, I show that these seemingly disparate litera-
tures have a common thread.  In that piece, I argue that states can
gerrymander to maximize the number of districts that mirror the par-
tisan composition of a majority of the electorate and the majority
party in the state in order to ensure that state interests are repre-
sented nationally.24  In other words, the state can maximize the num-
ber of safe districts for members of the majority party in order to send
a politically cohesive delegation to Congress, allowing the state to
directly influence federal policy.25  This observation is counterintui-
tive, as partisan gerrymandering is routinely lambasted in the schol-
22 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerry-
mandering, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 399, 419 (2005); Guy-Uriel E. Charles,
Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601, 638–49 (2007); Justin Driver, Rules,
the New Standards: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Manageability after Vieth v. Jube-
lirer, 73 GEO WASH. L. REV. 1166, 1174 (2005); Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards
(in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims after Vieth, 3 ELECTION L. J. 626,
634–37 (2004); Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 443–44 (2005); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutional-
ization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 57 (2004).
23 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRO-
CESS 177 (1980); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1500
(1994); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559
(1954).
24 See Tolson, supra note 12, at 890–91 (arguing that partisan gerrymandering is a R
political safeguard because the network of relationships that emerge through the
redistricting process—between the political parties, elected officials, interest groups,
political action committees, and the partisan media—reinforce the state’s partisan
identity and specific policy preferences emerge that can be promoted, through gerry-
mandering, at the national level).  This Article makes the more nuanced argument
that the state’s partisan identity is best reflected by a majority of the electorate as
opposed to the political party in power, although they tend to overlap. See also Mark
D. Brewer, The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of Partisan Conflict Within the Ameri-
can Electorate, 58 POL. RES. Q. 219, 219 (2005) (noting that the partisan changes in the
mass electorate has mirrored that which have occurred among political elites).
25 Promoting this type of partisan gerrymandering in the context of districted
elections is an attempt to produce similar results one would get in an at-large voting
scheme, in which a majority of voters select a majority of the representatives.  In an at-
large election, all of the voters vote for all of the open seats. See ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI,
THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1776-1850 126 (noting
that when congressional representatives were elected at-large before 1842, delega-
tions were more politically unified and were more likely to vote together).
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arly literature for imposing significant democratic harms on voters.26
Undeniably, there are harms that emerge from excessive partisanship,
but the fact remains that “politics as usual” is an expected and integral
aspect of our system.27
Partisan gerrymandering is an “extra-constitutional” safeguard of
federalism that can have significant democratic benefits through the
protection it affords the states.28  In my earlier piece, I use the debate
over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“Afford-
able Care Act”) to show that the expanding scope of federal legisla-
tion incentivizes the state to use its redistricting authority to ensure
that its policy preferences are represented at the federal level.  The
state’s ability to influence the reelection prospects of its House delega-
tion motivates its representatives to consider the state’s interests when
voting on and constructing federal policy.29  In a sense, the state is
part of its congressional delegation’s constituency, and the healthcare
law, which passed almost exclusively along party lines, is a prime
26 See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, New Issues in Minority Representation: Resurrecting the White
Primary, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 373–80 (2004); Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and
Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253, 269–70 (2006); Jamal Greene, Note, Judging
Partisan Gerrymanders under the Elections Clause, 114 YALE L.J. 1021, 1026 (2005); see also
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Politi-
cal Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 543 (2004); Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 614. R
27 Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that all
but one justice agreed in Vieth that “politics as usual” is a traditional redistricting
criterion); see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275, 285 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(arguing that the Framers anticipated that redistricting would be a political endeavor
which is why they provided a textual remedy in the Elections Clause); see also Craw-
ford v. Marion Cnty., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (plurality opinion) (upholding voter
identification law that was passed for partisan purposes because the state has an inter-
est in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process).
28 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) (“In the tension between
federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.”); cf. Kramer, supra note 13, at 269 R
(acknowledging that the Framers hated political parties but arguing that parties pro-
vide clear federalism benefits).
29 Tolson, supra note 12, at 893; see also Health Care Vote Puts Nelson 30 Points Down R
in Reelection Bid, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.rasmussenreports.
com/public_content/politics/elections/election_2012/election_2012_senate_elec
tions/nebraska/health_care_vote_puts_nelson_30_points_down_in_reelection_bid
(showing that support for Senator Ben Nelson, the only Democrat in Nebraska’s con-
gressional delegation (both House and Senate), dropped thirty points after he voted
in favor of the Affordable Care Act, contrary to the votes of the remaining members
of Nebraska’s congressional delegation, the wishes of state leaders, and the desires of
voters).
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example of how a divided delegation can frustrate the state’s pre-
ferred policy preferences.30
In this Article, I ultimately conclude that partisan gerrymander-
ing claims may defy direct regulation because it is not clear that courts
can adequately value its federalism benefit, but the inquiry does not
end there; the availability of partisan gerrymandering as a federalism
tool should influence the scope of judicial review with regards to
other substantive areas.  In making this point, however, it is important
to understand what it is about federalism that mandates weak enforce-
ment of partisan gerrymandering claims as a matter of judicial
restraint and institutional credibility.
A. Protecting Federalism through Structure: Original Safeguards and
the Judicial Role
Federalism, in both the case law and the legal scholarship, has
been overwhelmingly concerned with the question of “balance,” or
ensuring that each level of government stays within a defined regula-
tory sphere.31  Part of this debate centers around how federalism is
defined, which in turn affects where the line dividing the two spheres
is drawn.  As one commentator noted, federalism “is an arrangement
in which two or more self-governing communities share the same
political space,”32 but what seems like a simple premise has caused
incredible conceptual difficulty in both the legal scholarship and the
30 See Tolson, supra note 12, at 895 (discussing how Senator Nelson had to extract R
concessions from party leaders in order to appease elected officials in his home state
even though their preferred policy preference would have been for the state’s entire
delegation to vote against the health care bill).
31 See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY
& TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008); EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE 34 (2007); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Polit-
ical Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sover-
eignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 821 (1998); see also Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (“It is incontestible [sic] that the Constitution established a sys-
tem of ‘dual sovereignty.’” (citations omitted)); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458
(1990) (“[U]nder our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with
that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the
Supremacy Clause.”).
32 Dimitrios Karmis & Wayne Norman, The Revival of Federalism in Normative Politi-
cal Theory, in DIMITRIOS KARMIS & WAYNE NORMAN, EDS., THEORIES OF FEDERALISM: A
READER 3 (2005); see also DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 76–106 (1995)
(focusing on the preservation of state and local institutional authority as a justification
for federalism); Kramer, supra note 13, at 222 (“The whole point of federalism (or at R
least the best reason to care about it) is that, because preferences for governmental
policy are unevenly distributed among the states and regions of the nation, more
people can be satisfied by decentralized decisionmaking [sic].”); Michael W. McCon-
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courts.33  The difficulty emerges because it is virtually impossible to
draw a line between the sovereignty, or final policymaking authority,34
of each self-governing entity.
Drawing the line between the governing spheres of the states and
that of the federal government has become an obsession because our
current system reflects states that are far weaker—and a federal gov-
ernment that is more powerful—than the Framers intended.35  Article
II of the Articles of Confederation, eventually adopted by all thirteen
states, expressly provided that, “Each State retains its sovereignty, free-
dom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right,
which is not by this [C]onfederation expressly delegated to the United
States . . . .”36  As reflected in The Federalist Number 32 as well as the text
of the Constitution, this proposition of state sovereignty followed the
states into the creation of the new nation, despite the existence of a
new, more expansive federal government than that which existed
under the Articles.37  Indeed, the Framers hoped that by instituting
structural safeguards that give the states a role in the composition of
nell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987)
(emphasizing the “advantages of decentralized decision making”).
33 See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV.
4, 15 (2010) (discussing the debate in the literature about where the core of federal-
ism lies due to the difficulty of drawing a line between state and federal power).
34 See Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism
After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 344 (1985); Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sover-
eignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195,
1209–10 (2012).  This definitional problem is why there are dual, concurrent, cooper-
ative, and more recently, “collective action” theories of federalism in recognition of
the fact that, since 1937, “dual” sovereignty has been more imaginary than real. See,
e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law,
Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692
(2001).
35 See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 906, 908 (1994) (referring to our love of federalism as
a “neurosis” that “conjures up images of Fourth of July parades down Main Street,
drugstore soda fountains, and family farms with tire swings in the front yard”).
36 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II.
37 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 155 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009) (“[T]he plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation,
the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they
before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United
States.”); U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.”).
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the federal government38 and later, by adopting the Tenth Amend-
ment, this would ensure that the federal government did not usurp
the sovereign power that the states retained post-ratification.39
Articulating a vision of governance in which two sovereigns can
coexist harmoniously has led scholars and courts to focus on why we
“federated” in the first place.40  As Justice O’Connor famously stated
in Gregory v. Ashcroft, a mere six years after the Supreme Court swore
off federalism questions for good:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people
numerous advantages.  It assures a decentralized government that
will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous soci-
ety; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in
government; and it makes government more responsive by putting
the States in competition for a mobile citizenry. . . . [But p]erhaps
the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of
government power.41
Justice O’Connor went on to conclude that, “If this ‘double security’ is
to be effective, there must be a proper balance between the States and
the Federal Government . . . . In the tension between federal and state
power lies the promise of liberty.”42
38 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; art. I, § 3, cl. 1; art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (giving
states the power to choose the qualification of electors, elect Senators, and choose the
time, place, and manner of elections).
39 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801 (1995) (“‘[T]he
States unquestionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign authority.  They do
so, however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their
original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.’” (empha-
sis omitted) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549
(1985))).
40 See Karmis & Norman, supra note 32, at 8 (“Throughout much of the history of R
federalist thought—sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly—the answer to the
basic question ‘Why federate?’ has been because it gives a self-governing political
community the best of both worlds: the advantages of being part of a relatively small,
homogenous polity, along with the advantages of being part of a stronger, more
secure larger state or alliance . . . .”).
41 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); cf. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528 (1985) (holding that feder-
alism questions are best resolved by the political process, not the courts).
42 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459.  Although this Article focuses exclusively on how parti-
san gerrymandering helps preserve the states’ regulatory authority and contribute to
maintaining the balance, it also could conceivably promote some of these other inter-
ests as well. See Tolson, supra note 12, at 900 (“Partisan gerrymandering [can] . . . R
serve as a constraint on federal power and promote[ ] several federalism interests,
particularly the interest that the state has in promoting its own community values and
liberty, which can become muted from undue federal influence; the interest in hold-
ing its elected officials accountable, which can similarly become blurred because of
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With these lofty principles in mind, the Court held that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act did not invalidate a Missouri con-
stitutional amendment requiring judges to retire at age 70 because
this outcome would undermine “[t]he authority of people of the
States to determine the qualifications of their [most important] gov-
ernment officials . . . [which] lies at the heart of representative gov-
ernment.”43  Consequently, “[i]f Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Govern-
ment, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute.”44 Gregory’s plain statement rule illustrates
that federalism is not only about outcome—or where the boundary
lies—but also about process, which ensures that states actually have
power in the system.45
Protecting the “balance” by focusing on federalism as a “process”
has been key to understanding why there has been so much scholarly
focus on the “political safeguards of federalism,” or alternatively,
whether the states’ role in the composition of the federal government
is sufficient, without judicial oversight, to protect their regulatory
authority from federal overreaching.46  The perception that many of
the original safeguards have failed to protect the states’ interests has
led to calls by one contingent of scholars for increased judicial review
of federalism issues to account for these failures while other scholars
contend that the political process is still sufficient to protect the states,
failures notwithstanding.47  For those who advocate for limited or no
judicial oversight, the failure of the original safeguards has given rise
to additional, “extra-constitutional” institutional protections that obvi-
federal involvement in state processes; and most important, the interest the state has
in preserving its sovereignty in the face of expanding federal power.”).
43 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 463 (citations omitted).
44 Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
45 Id. at 461 (“This plain statement rule is nothing more than an acknowledg-
ment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional
scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.”); see also Gerken,
supra note 33, at 14 (“Process federalists emphasize that power diffusion depends on R
preserving de facto autonomy for the states, not the de jure autonomy afforded by
sovereignty.  Their functional account of federal-state interactions eschews formal
protections that can be enforced in court; they look to politics, tradition, inertia, and
interdependence as the guarantors of state power.”).
46 Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349,
1358–59 (2001) (arguing that in order for the political safeguards to work, defenders
of the states on Capitol Hill have to have notice about pending legislation that may
affect their interests); id. at 1359 (arguing that the result in Gregory v. Ashcroft was
about notice).
47 Compare Kramer, supra note 13, with John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Fed- R
eralism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997).
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ate or, at the very least, reduce the need for judicial review.48  For
others, judicial review remains the answer because the political pro-
cess is inadequate to police our system of federalism.49
One point that these camps agree on is that the original safe-
guards have failed in toto.  Notably, these scholars point to the adop-
tion of the Seventeenth Amendment, which eliminates the
appointment of Senators by the state legislatures and mandates popu-
lar election, as undermining the key institutional protection for states.
Moreover, the states’ authority over redistricting has been diminished
because federal voting rights legislation and various constitutional
amendments have reduced their authority to choose the qualifications
of electors unencumbered.50  Other structural mechanisms that were
designed to protect the states have also become weakened by changes
in the economy and technological advances.51
As the next section shows, however, the political/judicial safe-
guards debate does not resolve which political safeguards—either orig-
inal or otherwise—actually protect the states’ regulatory authority and
promote the federalism ideals articulated by the Court in Gregory.52
Grouping the safeguards together and labeling them “a failure” tells
us very little about what mechanisms are actually working to protect
the states.
48 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 13 (arguing that political parties serve this func- R
tion); see also infra note 71 and accompanying text. R
49 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited
and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 775
(1995); Yoo, supra note 47. R
50 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 13, at 226 (“What little control it may once have R
afforded—through, say, poll taxes or the exclusion of racial minorities—has been
eradicated by five constitutional amendments (Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as well as the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ments), federal voting rights legislation, and the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection
cases.  It is, in fact, impossible to think of anything a state could do to protect itself
with this power today that would not be either unlawful or ineffective.” (citations
omitted)).
51 See Lessig, supra note 19, at 1224–28 (arguing that these changes undermined R
our system of dual federalism and as a result, judicial rules promoting this system
became politicized).
52 See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (describing
current discourse as centering on a “stylized model of zero-sum federalism . . . which
emphasizes winner-takes-all jurisdictional competition”).  I posit that this notion of
“zero-sum federalism” also extends to questions of whether there should be judicial
review of federalism issues.
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B. Adding Nuance to the Debate: The Individual Safeguards of Federalism
The political/judicial safeguards debate highlights that the judici-
ary might face challenges, some insurmountable, in resolving issues
that involve the political safeguards writ large, but courts may be able
to adjudicate disputes implicating a specific safeguard.  For example,
Larry Kramer argues that the problem with judicially enforced feder-
alism is that courts are “poorly situated to make (or second guess) the
difficult judgments about where power should be settled or when it
can be shifted advantageously.”53  Along these lines, the courts strug-
gled to define the traditional governmental functions of states that are
off-limits to congressional regulation after the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in National League of Cities v. Usury.54  Contrary to Kramer’s argu-
ments, however, the Court has proven that it can successfully regulate
federalism when it does so incrementally, rather than attempting to
formulate a standard that would cover a host of issues that are not
amenable to a one-size-fits-all approach.55  The Court’s more mea-
53 Kramer, supra note 23, at 1500 (“Judges lack the resources and institutional R
capacity to gather and evaluate the data needed for such decisions.  They also lack the
democratic pedigree to legitimize what they do if it turns out to be controversial.  But
most of all, courts lack the flexibility to change or modify their course easily, an essen-
tial quality in today’s rapidly evolving world.”); see also Wechsler, supra note 23, at R
546–52, 558–59 (“[T]he existence of the states as governmental entities and as
sources of the standing law is in itself the prime determinant of our working
federalism.”).
54 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (insulating certain “traditional governmental func-
tions” of the states from federal regulation). Compare Amersbach v. City of Cleveland,
598 F.2d 1033, 1037–38 (6th Cir. 1979) (operating a municipal airport is a traditional
state function immune from federal regulation), and United States v. Best, 573 F.2d
1095 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding the same for licensing automobiles), and Gold Cross
Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (holding the
same for regulating ambulance services), with Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d
25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that regulation of traffic on public roads is not a tradi-
tional state function immune from federal regulation), and Woods v. Homes & Struc-
tures of Pittsburg, Kan., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980) (holding that issuance
of industrial development is not a traditional state function immune from federal
regulation ), and Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v. FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (W.D.
Okla. 1980) (holding the same for the regulation of intrastate natural gas sales).
55 See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372–74 (2001)
(holding the Americans with Disabilities Act invalid insofar as it abrogated the states’
sovereign immunity from suit); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997)
(invalidating provisions of the Brady Act that required state and local officials to exe-
cute provisions of the law); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating
the Gun Free School Zones Act by distinguishing Congress’s ability to regulate eco-
nomic behavior from noneconomic behavior that does not affect interstate com-
merce).  The recent decision on the Affordable Care Act could also be characterized
as an opinion illustrating judicial restraint because of institutional legitimacy con-
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sured and cautious manner in its recent cases is an attempt to retain a
role for judicial review in resolving federalism questions, but while
respecting the limits of the judiciary identified by Kramer and
others.56
Partisan gerrymandering raises many of the same problems that
have cofounded the Court in its federalism jurisprudence.  In this
context, the Court has struggled to discern what constitutes a “fair”
outcome but without constitutionally mandating proportional repre-
sentation, which leads to many of the same line-drawing problems that
plague its federalism case law.57  Because the construction of political
institutions is integral to determining the amount of power that is dis-
tributed between both levels of government and between the various
political forces within our system, Kramer’s warning about the judici-
ary’s limitations in making the appropriate assessments about how
power is divided between political institutions would seem to be espe-
cially forceful in this context.
Yet this concern about institutional competency has prompted
scholars writing in the election law area to advocate, not for noninter-
vention, but for rules that are easily administrable by the courts.58
Structuralists who advocate in favor of an approach known as the
political markets theory argue that partisan gerrymandering (and in
particular bipartisan gerrymanders) produce noncompetitive elec-
cerns, leading Justice Roberts to rely on Congress’s taxing power to validate the Act,
which he believed exceeded the scope of Congress’s commerce authority. See Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (describing the Affordable
Care Act as beyond the scope of Congress’s commerce authority because the law com-
pels individuals not already in commerce to purchase a product).
56 Kramer, supra note 23, at 1494–96 (conceding that judicial review is supposed R
to play a role in protecting federalism but arguing that there are still limits on judicial
power in this area).
57 See Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1364 (1987) (“[The rule established in
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), leads to proportional representation because
a] court cannot determine whether and to what extent a districting plan ‘will consist-
ently degrade a . . . group of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole’ . . .
unless the court can compare the group’s post-gerrymander representation in the
legislature to what the group’s ‘true’ representation would be under a ‘fair’ plan.  But
the latter obviously can be determined only by reference to some norm or bench-
mark.  For a political party, that benchmark can only be its performance at the polls.”
(citations omitted)).
58 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 620 (arguing that under a simple anti- R
trust analysis, which focuses on the importance of competitive elections for maximiz-
ing voter welfare, courts “whether using the per se or rule of reason approaches . . .
would be particularly skeptical of agreements in the political market because it is in
fact the ideal market for cartelization and suppression of competition”).
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tions by removing voters from the process, and should be per se inva-
lid.59  For these scholars, noncompetitive elections serve as the
starting point of assessing whether a redistricting plan raises constitu-
tional concerns.60  This is a pragmatic attempt to regulate gerryman-
dering that would render some overtly partisan plans per se
unconstitutional, at least where there is a bipartisan attempt to cancel
out competition, and render less biased but still partisan plans inher-
ently suspect.61  A per se rule would free the court from having to
define “a baseline for what constitutes a party’s ‘proper’ share of polit-
ical representation given the distribution of votes.”62  This approach
prioritizes the voters’ interest in a robust democracy over rules that
may on their face be constitutional but have the effect of undermin-
ing democratic accountability.63
However, rendering partisan plans “inherently suspect” provides
little guidance to courts trying to discern “politics as usual” from the
“excessive” gerrymandering that might raise constitutional concerns.64
59 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 649 (1998) (“[A] self-conscious judiciary
should destabilize political lockups in order to protect the competitive vitality of the
electoral process and facilitate more responsive representation.”); see also Issacharoff,
supra note 13, at 601 (“[One solution is] a prophylactic per se rule that redistricting R
conducted by incumbent powers is constitutionally intolerable.”); Samuel Issacharoff,
Surreply: Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684, 693 (2002); Katz, supra note 26, at 325 R
(“Noncompetitive districts elect officials with more extreme political views, . . . foster
more polarized legislatures, [and] inhibit meaningful political participation. . . . [In
contrast,] a competitive election offers to each voter . . . the opportunity to be the
coveted swing voter.” (citations omitted)); Pildes, Foreword, supra note 22, at 31; Rich- R
ard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605 (1999).
60 Issacharoff, supra note 59, at 684. R
61 Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 600; Issacharoff, supra note 59, at 684; see also R
Pildes, supra note 22, at 59; Pildes, supra note 59; cf. Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomina- R
tion Model and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1440 (2008) (argu-
ing that courts should evaluate the legislature’s adoption of a new rule for its
dominating effect, and once a certain threshold is reached, return the issue to the
legislature for resolution).
62 Pildes, supra note 22, at 59.
63 Issacharoff, supra note 59, at 692–93; see also Daniel Ortiz, Duopoly Versus Auton- R
omy: How the Two-Party System Harms the Major Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 764–65
(2000) (“Knowing that consumers have at most only one other real choice in elec-
tions, parties will act less responsively to voters [and] . . . will feel little need to pro-
duce the same product they would in the face of stiff competition.  Instead, they may
run candidates matching their own policy preferences or hard-working, though unin-
spiring, party loyalists.”).
64 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 (2004) (“[T]he fact that partisan district-
ing is a lawful and common practice means that there is almost always room for an
election-impeding lawsuit contending that partisan advantage was the predominant
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This is particularly important here, where “politics as usual” could
help states to restore some of the federalism balance that has been
lost.  The political markets theory’s focus on noncompetitive elections
would defy this effort and lead to the invalidation of almost all federal-
ism-reinforcing gerrymanders.65  Factoring partisan gerrymandering’s
federalism potential into the analysis shows us that per se rules would
not work.
Treating partisan gerrymandering solely as a “federalism” issue
subject to judicial review under this line of precedent is just as unsatis-
factory.  Despite those who advocate for a judicially enforceable feder-
alism, it is not clear whether many of the federalism cases that the
Court has resolved do more on balance to protect the states’ institu-
tional interests than the bargaining that occurs through the political
process.66  In United States v. Lopez,67 for example, the Court invali-
dated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made possession of a
gun in a school zone a federal offense, on the grounds that the statute
exceeded the scope of Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause.  The Court also invalidated the civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act in United States v. Morrison on similar
grounds.68  Although these decisions represented the Court’s attempt
to impose substantive limitations on the reach of Congress’s com-
motivation.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Persily, supra note 12, at 662 (arguing that R
competitiveness is an elusive standard by which to determine the constitutionality of a
gerrymander because, for example, “[a] bipartisan gerrymander produces seats that
are potentially competitive in a primary election, and almost certainly so if an incum-
bent is not in the race”).
65 See Pildes, supra note 59, at 1615–16 (“The emphasis on political competition R
is both a theoretical perspective on politics and a foundation for judicial decision in
cases that must be decided on the basis of some conception, implicit or explicit, of the
aims of democracy.  As a theoretical perspective, it might indeed cause us to reexam-
ine longstanding political structures—often adopted before alternative possibilities
were conceived, as is true of the winner-take-all versus PR ‘choice’—and ask today
whether post-Founding Era alternatives would better realize the appropriate values of
democracy.”). But see Persily, supra note 12, at 658 (noting that although bipartisan R
gerrymanders provide the impetus for the political markets theory, the approach
would invalidate partisan gerrymanders as well).
66 Baker & Young, supra note 49, at 87–88 (acknowledging that there has been a R
“graveyard” of judicial efforts to monitor and police the boundaries of state and fed-
eral authority and contending that the failure of the Court’s dual federalism jurispru-
dence does not mean that “the Court is somehow institutionally incapable of
fashioning new rules that would constrain Congress while at the same time con-
straining the courts”); see also Yoo, supra note 47, at 1370 (arguing that the Framers R
created a stronger federal judiciary to protect the states as states).
67 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995).
68 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
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merce power, Congress still has significant authority under the Spend-
ing and Taxing Clauses to impose its authority on the states, and force
them, under threat of financial penalty, to adopt measures similar to
those invalidated in Lopez and Morrison.69  It is only by controlling the
composition of Congress that states can deter that body from adopt-
ing such measures.70  Ensuring that the safeguards that allow the
states to influence the composition of the federal government are
properly working is one way in which the judiciary can effectively play
the role advocated by the judicial safeguards camp, but without devel-
oping doctrine that does little to cabin congressional authority in
practice.
The solution is what I refer to as a more “nuanced” version of
process federalism, where the judiciary promotes those policies that
strengthen the structural protections enjoyed by the states rather than
attempting to police our system of federalism in its entirety.71  Like
69 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act exceeds the scope of Congress’s com-
merce authority but is valid under its taxing power); see also Jesse H. Choper, Taming
Congress’s Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L.
REV. 731, 762 (2003) (“As with Congress’s power to regulate the channels of interstate
commerce, the nationalization of the economy and society gives the legislature’s
power over the instrumentalities of interstate commerce a potentially all-encompass-
ing reach which must be checked by the Court if its rejuvenation of states’ rights is to
succeed.”).
70 Choper, supra note 69, at 735.
71 This approach builds on arguments currently advanced by process federalism
scholars who believe that the competition between the states and the federal govern-
ment will generate protections for the states but judicial review can be justified if the
process breaks down. See infra Part III.A.1.b (using section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
as a mechanism to address a specific process failure in order to protect voters).  Many
of these scholars first focus on a specific safeguard—either original or extra-constitu-
tional—and then decide whether judicial review is appropriate and what form it
should take. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,
79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324–25 (2001) (“[Federal lawmaking procedures] safeguard
federalism by permitting designated agents of the federal government to adopt fed-
eral law only if they employ procedures that ‘impose burdens . . . that often seem
clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable’ . . . but also function[ ] to preserve ‘the govern-
ance prerogatives of state and local institutions.’” (citations omitted)); Gillian E.
Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2062 (2008)
(arguing that the Court can use already established administrative law principles in
order to reinforce agency attentiveness to state interests); Robert A. Mikos, The Popu-
list Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1669, 1718 (2007) (“By demonstrating
that demands for federalization are often ineffectual and that citizens actually have
powerful incentives to protect state authority, the populist safeguards theory under-
cuts one of the primary rationales for judicial review of federalism—the notion that
citizens, left to their own devices, would grant Congress authority over myriad issues
the states instead ought to control.”).  Larry Kramer relies on similar populist safe-
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the approach endorsed by Larry Kramer, this theory assumes that the
extra-constitutional safeguards are working to correct the failures of
the original safeguards and protect the states, but it does not eschew
judicial review because the Court can play an important role in rein-
forcing the effectiveness of these mechanisms.72
A more nuanced approach reflects the reality of judicial decision-
making—a court will never deal with an issue that implicates the
entirety of our federalism.  Rather, the issues will vary, ranging from
questions of preemption to state sovereign immunity to constitutional
structure, and some judicial decisions will have a larger impact on the
working balance of our federalism than others.73  In addition, our sys-
tem of federalism has been modified by changes including the adop-
tion of various constitutional amendments,74 the integration of the
national economy, and the rise of political parties, to name a few
examples.  These changes require that any potential safeguards be
assessed individually in order to ascertain the appropriate judicial
response.  This piecemeal approach would reveal that there are some
political safeguards that adequately protect the states while others
require judicial reinforcement in one form or another.75
guards to conclude that judicial review is not needed at all, and frames the responsi-
bility of judges, at least at the time of the Founding, as enforcing duly enacting laws
and avoiding constitutional questions. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 58 (2004).  Kramer argues:
Just as it is not your place to punish me for violating ordinary law, so too in a
regime of popular constitutionalism it was not the judiciary’s responsibility
to enforce the constitution against the legislature.  It was the people’s
responsibility: a responsibility they discharged mainly through elections, but
also, if necessary, by other, extralegal means.
Id. Unlike other scholars and the approach advocated here, however, he does not
advocate for judicial review even when the safeguards fail.
72 See infra Part III.A.  Judicial review might also be appropriate because there are
democratic norms that can be impermissibly sacrificed in the political process.  See
also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (stating that excessive partisanship can
violate the Constitution).
73 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federal-
ism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002) (observing that the Supreme Court has
used sub-constitutional doctrines to make incremental changes to its federalism doc-
trine because path dependent processes have affected its ability to deviate from its
federalism precedents without sacrificing its institutional legitimacy).
74 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
75 See Clark, supra note 71, at 1325 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s Commerce R
Clause decisions do not impact federalism as much as strictly enforcing federal law-
making procedures because the Commerce Clause decisions only “police the outer
boundaries of federal power—boundaries that have proven difficult to draw and
enforce”).
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In promoting a more measured and careful study of the political
safeguards, this Article attempts to determine the judicial role in pro-
moting the structural benefits that states receive from their ability to
engage in partisan gerrymandering by treating it as a federalism sub-
issue.  As the next section shows, there is a strong historical argument
for protecting and promoting partisan gerrymandering as a political
safeguard because the Framers intended that the House of Represent-
atives play a role in protecting state interests.
II. THE HOUSE AS THE LOCUS OF DEMOCRACY?  THE SENATE AS THE
VOICE OF THE STATES?: FIXING THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS NARRATIVE
Extra-constitutional safeguards emerged in response to a Consti-
tution that failed to protect the states and individual citizens despite
intricate checks and balances designed to disperse the personal ambi-
tion of elected officials in the interest of the public good.76  Political
parties became a staple soon after ratification to account for these
institutional failures, but parties also represented a failure in the sys-
tem itself.  The Framers designed the Constitution to control faction
by diffusing power horizontally across the three branches of the fed-
eral government and vertically between the federal and state govern-
ments so as to limit collusion among public officials, a design flaw that
factions exploited through the party system.77  Parties connected state
76 Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 43
(1985).  As Sunstein observed:
The structural provisions of the Constitution attempted to bring about pub-
lic-spirited representation, to provide safeguards in its absence, and to
ensure an important measure of popular control.  Bicameralism thus
attempted to ensure that some representatives would be relatively isolated
while others would be relatively close to the people.  Indirect election of
representatives played a far more important role at the time of ratification
than it does today; the fact that state legislatures chose senators ensured that
one house of the national legislature would have additional insulation from
political pressure.  The electoral college is another important example; it
was to be a deliberative body standing apart from constituent pressures.
Id. (citations omitted); see also H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judi-
cially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 892–93 (1999) (“[The Supreme
Court’s failure to limit national power] seems almost inevitable [because the] fram-
ers’ chosen mechanism was to enumerate the national government’s powers, leaving
all other governmental authority to the states.  But the enumerated powers granted,
in light of revolutionary changes in the national economy, have turned out to be
broad enough to allow congressional control over almost any imaginable activity.”).
77 Sunstein, supra note 76, at 44 ([“The federal system itself was supposed to act R
as an important safeguard because the] different governments will control each other
and ensure stalemate rather than action at the behest of particular private interests.
The jealousy of state governments and the attachment of the citizenry to local inter-
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and federal officials in a way that prevented the states’ role in the
composition of the federal government from cabining federal author-
ity.  These entities also rendered obsolete the Electoral College’s
intended purpose of protecting smaller states and maintaining the
independence of the president by selecting electors who are commit-
ted to vote for the party’s slate of candidates in advance of the elec-
tion.78  But over the years, parties have mediated disputes between the
states and the federal government in a way that has been good for
preserving state power, with political elites galvanizing their support-
ers through the party apparatus in response to objectionable federal
policy.79  So, in a sense, political parties were the first extra-constitu-
tional safeguard, and as such, the basis for Larry Kramer’s theory that
they should now be treated as one of the political safeguards of
federalism.80
ests would provide additional protection against the aggrandizement of power in
national institutions.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 1, at 2313 (“To this day, the idea of self-sustaining politi- R
cal competition built into the structure of government is frequently portrayed as the
unique genius of the U.S. Constitution, the very basis for the success of American
democracy.  Yet the truth is closer to the opposite.  The success of American democ-
racy overwhelmed the Madisonian conception of separation of powers almost from
the outset, preempting the political dynamics that were supposed to provide each
branch with a ‘will of its own’ that would propel departmental ‘[a]mbition . . . to
counteract ambition.’” (citations omitted)).
78 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 1, at 2323; see also Kramer, supra note 13, at 225 R
(“[T]he power of state legislators to pick electors could have given the states consider-
able leverage over the chief executive had the Electoral College stayed true to its
original design.  But the emergence of the popular canvass and winner-take-all rule
have deprived the College of most of its significance.”).
79 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 13, at 276 (“[I]f parties were a problem for federal- R
ism as the Founders [had] conceived it in 1788, they were also a solution.  Realizing
that state representatives could no longer necessarily be counted on to champion the
cause of the states, Republican leaders changed strategies.  They abandoned the
effort to check Congress through the agency of formal state institutions and turned
instead to the fledgling Republican Party—using the Virginia and Kentucky Resolu-
tions (together with objections to high taxes, big government, weak foreign policy,
corrupt finances, and the Federalists’ aristocratic style) as propaganda to galvanize
support in a successful national election campaign.” (citations omitted)).
80 Id. at 282 (“The parties influenced federalism by establishing a framework for
politics in which officials at different levels were dependent upon each other to get,
and stay, elected.  Candidates may need the parties somewhat less than they used to;
state parties may be somewhat less powerful than they were formerly; but there is no
doubt that political parties continue to play a crucial role in forging links between
officials at the state and federal level.  The political dependency of state and federal
officials on each other remains among the most notable facts of American govern-
ment.” (citations omitted)).
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After two centuries, it is beyond dispute that social, economic,
and political changes have rendered obsolete other structural protec-
tions, making political parties and other stop gap measures indispen-
sible parts of our system.  The popular election of Senators, the
appointment of presidential electors on a winner-take-all basis in most
states, the implementation of certain threshold requirements for voter
qualifications and redistricting—all of these are changes that scholars
point to as evidence that the original political safeguards of federalism
are archaic and irrelevant.81  Yet there is a powerful counter-narrative
that illustrates that the very forces that negated the original safeguards
have also breathed life into new ones.82  Indeed, partisan redistricting
is one such “sleeping dragon,” awakened by the political and historical
changes that rendered the states’ power over elections an ineffective
check on the federal government.
This section discusses how the Seventeenth Amendment and the
rule of population equality adopted in cases such as Gray v. Sanders,
Reynolds v. Sims, and in particular, Wesberry v. Sanders, have allowed the
partisan gerrymandering of congressional districts to become an
extra-constitutional federalism safeguard and play a role similar to
that which the Senate played prior to the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment.  This is contrary to the traditional narrative, which
presents the Senate as the key institutional protection for the states,
and the House as serving the sole purpose of representing the
people.83
81 Clark, supra note 71, at 1370 (“[These changes have] virtually eliminated the
possibility of selection of the President in the House voting by states.”); Yoo, supra
note 47, at 1321. R
82 Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 91, 112 (2003) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause authorizes judicial
review of statutes that exceed federal power, in part because unconstitutional federal
statutes contravene the principle that the state retains powers not delegated to the
federal government).
83 See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mass: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’
Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 504 (1997) (“The mechanism
by which the states could most readily defend against federal encroachment was their
representation in the Senate.”); see also Wechsler, supra note 23, at 547–48. But see R
Yoo, supra note 47, at 1369 (noting that the Senate was not “a perfect representative R
of state interests” given that it had duties that had nothing to do with the states such
as its role in the treatymaking process; noting further that the absence of uniform
voting among state delegations and the payment of Senators by the federal govern-
ment and not the states also undermine the argument that the Framers constructed
the Senate solely for the purpose of protecting state sovereignty).  Yoo argues that
these limitations on the Senate show that judicial review is also supposed to play a role
in protecting the states; he does not focus on the role of the House. Id. at 1371–72.
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The general sentiment is that the Framers designed the House of
Representatives, subject to popular election every two years, to simul-
taneously represent the interests of the people while cabining the
excesses of democracy.  In contrast, the Senate, with the appointment
of its members by the state legislatures for six-year terms, represented
the institutional interests of the states.84  What the legal scholarship
overlooks, however, is that the Framers also anticipated that the
House would be responsive to the interests of the States.
Article I, Section 2 provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members cho-
sen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the
Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.85
Even in the text, we see a caveat to total control of the House by
the people: that “the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifica-
tions requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.”  To understand the importance of this exception, note
that the main provision of the text—that members are elected “every
second Year by the People”—was less about any grand commitment to
promoting democracy and more about controlling potential miscon-
duct by state officials.  During the Constitutional Convention, the del-
egates opted to mandate elections every two years instead a shorter
duration because, according to one delegate, “annual elections were a
source of great mischief in the States,” but the “people were attached
to the frequency of elections.”86  However, if the delegates were con-
cerned about mischief at the hands of the states, and hence that is why
elections for the House are not held annually, then why does this
clause give states the right to choose the qualifications of electors?
This is an important power that the Constitution leaves in the hands
of states, even though the House is supposed to represent the people
and the Framers were concerned about potential misconduct by the
states.  As Madison argued during the ratification debates, if the state
84 JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 140 (Gaillard Hunt & James
Brown Scott, eds., 2007) (Comments of Benjamin Franklin) (“[The] General Govern-
ment [should be able to defend itself] by having an appointment of some one constit-
uent branch of the State Governments [since the State Legislatures] by this
participation in the General Government [through the Senate] would have an oppor-
tunity of defending their rights.”).
85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1–2.
86 MADISON, supra note 84, at 144 (Comments of Edmund Randolph) (pointing R
to state constitutions that had established annual elections).
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legislatures could control the qualification of both the electors and
the elected, then “it can by degrees subvert the Constitution.”87
One obvious reason for leaving this control in the hands of the
states is that the delegates could not agree on what qualifications
should be required of citizens to vote for members of the House.88
But another reason to grant states significant authority over the com-
position of the House is because the House plays an important role in
maintaining the balance of power between the state and the federal
government that is often overlooked because of that body’s perceived
purpose of providing a voice for the public.89  In reality, the Framers’
concerns about state mischief had to be counterbalanced against the
concerns that the states had about the Constitution’s creation of a
new central government with potentially expansive powers.  To
address this latter concern, the Framers gave the states the ability to
choose both the qualifications of electors and, pursuant to the Elec-
tions Clause, each Congressman’s constituency, which allows the states
to indirectly influence the scope of federal policy.
Indeed, the Elections Clause highlights the tension that emerges
between the states’ role in the composition of the House and the per-
ception that the House is supposed to be “the grand depository of the
democratic principle of the Govt.”90  The Elections Clause provides
that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Sena-
tors and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Leg-
islature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”91
87 Id. at 374.
88 Id. at 354 (Comments of Benjamin Franklin) (“[T]he elected [did not have]
any right in any case to narrow the privileges of the electors.”); id. (comments of John
Mercer) (“[T]he mode of election by the people [is dangerous because t]he people
can not know and judge of the characters of the Candidates.” (emphasis omitted)).
89 See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).  The Court argued that the
one person, one vote principle was necessary in part because the constitutional his-
tory supported this notion that the House is supposed to represent the “people” and
is therefore different from the Senate:
The question of how the legislature should be constituted precipitated the
most bitter controversy of the Convention.  One principle was uppermost in
the minds of many delegates: that, no matter where he lived, each voter
should have a voice equal to that of every other in electing members of
Congress.
Id. at 10–11 (citing James Madison and George Mason).
90 Id. at 10 (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 48
(Farrand ed., 1911) (comments of James Madison)).
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 27  6-DEC-12 10:35
2012] benign  partisanship 421
As the text illustrates, the Framers delegated plenary authority
over elections to the states, but subject to certain constraints.  Notably,
the constraint in the Elections Clause was not “the people,” but Con-
gress.  As Alexander Hamilton pointed out in The Federalist Number 59,
the Elections Clause is defensible because even though “every govern-
ment ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation,” if
“the State legislatures were to be invested with an exclusive power of
regulating these elections, every period of making them would be a
delicate crisis in the national situation.”92  So although the states’
power over elections is extensive, Congress’s ability to “make or alter
such regulations” is essentially a veto authority over state electoral
mechanisms to prevent abuse.93  States can redistrict pursuant to their
authority under the Elections Clause, a provision that divides power
between the states and the federal government with no mention of
“the people.”  Hamilton’s observation about the volatile nature of
elections makes their exclusion no surprise; this provision reflects the
Framer’s distrust of both state governments and the ability of the peo-
ple to control their representatives.  Nevertheless, states have signifi-
cant authority over the direction of federal law by virtue of their
power to choose the qualifications of electors under Article I and to
draw districts under the Elections Clause, with little input from the
people on both fronts.94
Thus, the text itself stands contrary to the perception that the
Framers designed the House to be insulated from state interests and
therefore not serve as a safeguard of federalism similar to the Sen-
ate.95  In fact, the Senate had a more limited role in protecting state
interests prior to the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment than
is commonly assumed, leaving significant room for the House to serve
the dual function of protecting both the states and the people.96  Pre-
Seventeenth Amendment, the power of state legislatures to impose
binding instructions on their Senators had significantly decreased,
92  THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 299, 302 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books
1992).
93 Tolson, supra note 34, at 1225–26. R
94 Tolson, supra note 12. R
95 Cf. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional
Interpretation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 702–03 (2008) (“The Founders specifically
designed the Senate to represent the states in the new federal government.”);
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
887, 920 (2003) (arguing that the House and the President serve state interests to a
lesser degree than the Senate); Wechsler, supra note 23, at 548–552 (positing that R
states’ control of voter qualifications and districting allow them to use House mem-
bership to safeguard their own interests).
96 Bybee, supra note 83, at 505. R
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leaving Senators with significant discretion over policy matters.97
Moreover, state legislatures had no power to recall Senators, which
would have been an effective enforcement mechanism to ensure that
Senators followed instructions.98  The failure at the Founding to make
instructions binding or institute recall mechanisms for disobedient
Senators is plausible if the House, and to some extent, the states’ role
in the selection of the President, were also institutional mechanisms
designed to give the states additional avenues to protect their regula-
tory interests.
In addition to the text, there is also sound historical evidence
demonstrating that the House was not supposed to be immune from
the policy preferences of state officials, and that this influence contin-
ued long after the states’ influence over their Senators waned.  Post-
ratification, states instructed their House delegations on how to vote
on federal policy, although these instructions were not binding to the
same extent as instructions to the Senate had been.99  Nonetheless,
this power, when combined with their authority over elections, gave
the states considerable voice with their congressional delegation.100
This influence was not lost simply because House members were sub-
ject to periodic elections.  Indeed, the fact that House members were
up for election every two years in districts drawn by the state, as
opposed to every six years in statewide elections like Senators, made it
more likely that House members would be responsive to state and
constituent pressures.101
97 Id. at 557 (discussing how over time, there were fewer consequences for Sena-
tors who ignored instructions from state legislatures).
98 Id. at 505.
99 Id. at 518–19 & n.108 (citing a Virginia Resolution condemning Andrew Jack-
son’s decision to remove federal funds from the Bank of the United States).  The
resolution provided:
Resolved, That our Senators be instructed, and our Representatives be
requested, to adopt prompt and efficient measures to vindicate the constitu-
tion, and to redress the evils occasioned by the late unauthorized assump-
tion of power by the President over the public moneys of the United States.
10 REG. DEB. 2840 (1834); see also Bybee, supra note 83, at 525–26 (noting that states
frequently instructed their Senators and Representatives on important matters during
the Founding period, which many Senators believed were binding).
100 Tolson, supra note 12. R
101 Beginning in the nineteenth century, Congress required states to have dis-
tricted elections for representatives. See Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5
Stat. 491, 491 (1842).  In 1901, Congress added a compactness requirement.  Reap-
portionment Act of 1901, ch. 93, § 3, 31 Stat. 733 (1901).  And in 1929, Congress
established a permanent method for apportioning House seats after each Census.
Reapportionment Act of 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 2a, § 22
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The role of the House in protecting the states became lost in the
scholarly dialogue because most of the focus has been on the Senate
and how popular election undermined that chamber’s role in our fed-
eral system.102  Other scholars simply assumed that the Senate contin-
ued to play a state protectionist role, albeit in a more diluted form.
Notably, Herbert Wechsler argued that the shift to popular election of
the Senate did not diminish the Senate “as the guardian of state inter-
ests”103 because its structure was still amenable to protecting these
interests, even if individual Senators were no longer obligated.104
Even if Wechsler is right, however, this ignores that the Framers
of the Seventeenth Amendment wanted to make the Senate immune
from the control of state legislatures.  In a sense, they were respond-
ing to public pressure to fix a specific problem: that the appointment
of Senators by the state legislature had led to a corrupt process result-
ing in the election of individuals who were beholden to corporate
interests.  Yet many of the drafters denied that the popular election of
Senators would change the balance of federalism, primarily because
thirty-one states had already adopted statutes mandating direct elec-
tion to address the corruption problem.105  Because of this precedent,
the House Committee Report on the proposed Seventeenth Amend-
ment observed that the popular election of Senators might “change
[the Senator’s] relations to certain interests and certain forces within
the State,” but dismissed this concern, positing that “if we are to sup-
(2006)).  Beyond these requirements, congressional oversight of congressional elec-
tions was limited until the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
102 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of
the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1015 (1994) (noting that the election
by states restrained the growth of the federal government relative to the states).
103 Wechsler, supra note 23, at 548.
104 Id. at 547–48 (“The forty-nine votes that will determine Senate action, even
with full voting, could theoretically be drawn from twenty-five states, of which the
combined population does not reach twenty-nine millions, a bare 19% of all state
residents.  The one-third plus one that will defeat a treaty or a resolution of amend-
ment could, equally theoretically, be drawn from seventeen states with a total popula-
tion little over twelve millions, less than that of New York.” (footnotes omitted)).
105 See JOSEPH L. BRISTOW, THE DIRECT ELECTION OF SENATORS, S. DOC. NO. 62-666,
at 4–5 (1912) (“With the development during recent times of the great corporate
interests of the country, and the increased importance of legislation relating to their
affairs, they have tenaciously sought to control the election of Senators friendly to
their interests.  The power of these great financial and industrial institutions can be
very effectively used in the election of Senators by legislatures, and they have many
times during recent years used that power . . . .”); WILLIAM WALLER RUCKER, ELECTION
OF SENATORS BY THE PEOPLE, H.R. REP. NO. 62-2, at 4 (1911) (supporting the proposi-
tion that many of the drafters of the amendment denied that the popular election of
Senators would change the balance of federalism).
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pose that a State consists of all the people and of all the interests, will
[the Senator] not still be its representative in every sense when his
election comes from all the people of his State?”106
Contrary to these assertions, it is clear that the Seventeenth
Amendment changed our system of federalism and in doing so,
undermined one of the key safeguards of federalism.107  According to
one scholar, the amendment “loosened constraints that had previ-
ously limited the ability of the federal government to transfer wealth
to organized special-interest groups.”108  The Seventeenth Amend-
ment undeniably changed the states’ ability to voice their policy pref-
erences in the Senate, but it is debatable whether the Framers of the
Seventeenth Amendment achieved their goal of insulating Senators
from the control of the state legislatures and making them more
popularly accountable.  Even if they were successful, there is no indi-
cation, either in the historical record or otherwise, that the House is
supposed to be similarly insulated from state power.109  The drafters
of the Seventeenth Amendment voiced some concerns about what the
amendment would mean for Congress’s authority under the Elections
Clause over both Senate and House elections.110  But these concerns
have proven to be unfounded as the Seventeenth Amendment in no
106 RUCKER, supra note 105, at 3.
107 See Kramer, supra note 13, at 224 (“To the extent that Senators respond to R
popular pressure from constituents—a product of the Seventeenth Amendment’s
elimination of the one feature of the Senate that really might have protected states,
the power of state legislators to choose Senators—the equal representation of each
state distorts democratic decisionmaking.”); see also Zywicki, supra note 102, at 1014 R
(“In addition to increasing the likelihood that those of high character and achieve-
ment would be chosen as senators, selection of senators by state legislatures would
‘giv[e] to the state governments such an agency in the formation of the federal gov-
ernment, as must secure the authority of the former; and [would] form a convenient
link between the two systems.’” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 416 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961))). But see Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of
Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1347, 1349–50 (1996) (arguing that the direct election of Senators has greater impli-
cations for separation of powers rather than federalism); Bybee, supra note 83, at 536 R
(arguing that the original structure did not do much to protect state interests).
108 Zywicki, supra note 102, at 1033; see also Bybee, supra note 83, at 535–36 (argu- R
ing that the direct election of Senators led to the massive expansion of federal
power).
109 See Tolson, supra note 12, at 878 (“As early as 1842, when Congress first
required that representatives be elected by district, it did not give itself the duty of
drawing the lines—it left this to the states.”).
110 In the debate in the House over the resolution that would provide for the
popular election of Senators, the following exchange took place over what affect the
proposed amendment would have on Congress’s authority under the Elections
Clause:
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way altered the states’ authority under the Elections Clause over House
elections, and by implication, left the states’ relationship with their
House delegations intact.
Indeed, over fifty years ago, Wechsler suggested that it “may be
said, and perhaps rightly, that the situation with respect to district-
ing . . . has little bearing on the role of Congress in preserving federal-
ist values.”111  But he ultimately concluded that he is “not so sure” that
this is right because “[i]t is significant, for one thing, that it is the
states that draw the districts . . . .”112  The states’ authority over redis-
tricting is a powerful indicator that, despite the traditional view of the
House as a representative of the people, the state legislatures still
retain important control over their House delegation.113
It was not until after Baker v. Carr, which held that legislative mal-
apportionment claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection
Clause,114 that state legislatures realized that gerrymandering could
serve the interests of the states in the same way that their control over
the composition of the Senate once had.  Notably, Baker and the “one
Mr. MARTIN of South Dakota.  The effect of the adoption of the amend-
ment in the form proposed in this resolution would be to create the condi-
tion by which Congress would still have power to regulate the election
pertaining to Members of the House and not of the Senate, would it not?
Mr. YOUNG of Michigan.  I wish to say that I do not know . . . . I think it was
undoubtedly the intention of the men who framed this provision to leave
that power over the election of Representatives.  But I do not know whether
they have done it or not.
Mr. MARTIN of South Dakota.  It would certainly leave no power as to the
election of Senators with Congress.
47 CONG. REC. 207 (1911).
111 Wechsler, supra note 23, at 551. R
112 Id.
113 In 1842, Congress passed a law requiring that all congressmen be elected from
districts rather than at-large in order to impose a uniform system nationwide.  Moreo-
ver, small states that benefitted from using at-large rather than districted elections
supported this measure in order to avoid the uniform adoption of at-large elections,
particularly by larger states, which would significantly diminish the power of the
smaller states in Congress. See ZAGARRI, supra note 25, at 130-31 (“If each state could
cast its vote as a single bloc—a capability that at-large elections would give them—
then the small states’ votes, both individually and collectively, would dwindle into
complete insignificance.”).  But even with the requirement of districted elections,
states can still exercise significant authority over their congressional delegations
because of gerrymandering. See Tolson, supra note 12, at 886-87 (arguing that the
1842 Reapportionment Act did not undermine the states’ ability to gerrymander); but
see Paul E. McGreal, Unconstitutional Politics, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 519 (2001) (argu-
ing that the 1842 Reapportionment Act requiring single member districts is
unconstitutional).
114 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
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person, one vote” cases changed the way in which states used their
redistricting authority to protect their interests, and it did not turn
out to be the boondoggle for democracy that many envisioned.115
Commentators at the time observed that the “one person, one vote”
principle of Wesberry v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims, which followed
Baker, had much to commend it because “the rule clearly encapsulates
in a slogan a concept that is so appealing in its expression of the egali-
tarian assumptions of a democratic society that it attained instant pop-
ular acceptance and legislative acquiescence,” but in reality, it is not
clear what the Court actually intended to accomplish by mandating
population equality.116  As one scholar argued:
By framing the issue exclusively in terms of the numerical aspects of
districting, the rule diverts attention from the question of what con-
stitutional objective it is intended to achieve.  If the goal is that no
person’s vote can have a greater political effect than any other per-
son’s vote, that cannot be achieved simply by assuring that a citizen
lives in a legislative district that is no larger in population than any
other district.  Some heed must also be paid to insuring that district-
ing plans do not deny representation to, or do not systematically
underrepresent, particular social groups or interests or concerns
that may be of special importance to some but not necessarily
favored by those dominant in the legislature.  In short, the rule of
“one person, one vote” ignores the problems presented by the prac-
tice of gerrymandering.117
As state legislatures quickly realized, gerrymandering could coex-
ist comfortably beside the one person, one vote doctrine, which
alarmed numerous dissenters in cases following Reynolds and Wes-
berry.118  But this does not have to be a matter of alarm—partisan ger-
115 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964) (establishing “one person, one
vote” doctrine to govern malapportionment claims for state legislative districts); Wes-
berry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (establishing the same for congressional dis-
tricts); Baker, 369 U.S. at 237 (finding that malapportionment claims are justiciable
under the Equal Protection Clause).
116 Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the Thorns of the
Thicket at Last, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 177 (1986).
117 Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases:
Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 112–13
(2000).
118 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 776 (1983) (White, J., dissenting)
(“Although neither a rule of absolute equality nor one of substantial equality can
alone prevent deliberate partisan gerrymandering, the former offers legislators a
ready justification for disregarding geographical and political boundaries.”); Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 622 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Recognizing that ‘indiscriminate districting’
is an invitation to ‘partisan gerrymandering’ . . .  the Court nevertheless excludes
virtually every basis for the formation of electoral districts other than ‘indiscriminate
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rymandering as a safeguard of federalism fits comfortably with the
constitutional history, text, and the Court’s doctrines.119  It allows
states to comply with their constitutional and statutory obligations to
draw districts while protecting their governing prerogatives.  States
can constitutionally redistrict more frequently120 which, when com-
bined with the infrequency that Congress uses its power to “make or
alter” congressional districts121 and the lack of judicial solicitude of
continuing federal involvement in state electoral processes,122 means
that partisan gerrymandering permits the House to play a role similar
to the pre-Seventeenth Amendment Senate.123
III. DEFINING A ROLE FOR THE COURTS: THE LEGAL AND
STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRO-FEDERALISM GERRYMANDERING
The process of gerrymandering is both inherently political and
ties directly into the balance of our federalism; consequently, there is
a risk that, like broader issues of federalism, any standard employed by
the Supreme Court to regulate gerrymandering will become
politicized.  As Lawrence Lessig has argued, the Court’s early reliance
on formalism to maintain the boundary between state and federal
power made any deviation from the status quo appear political.  The
Court’s pivot with respect to addressing the expansion of federal
power brought on by the New Deal,124 to resolving issues surrounding
districting.’” (citing majority opinion at 578–79)); see also Richard L. Engstrom, The
Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair
and Effective Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 278 (1976) (“Not only had the
Court failed to develop effective checks on the practice of gerrymandering, but in
pursuing the goal of population equality to the point of satiety it had actually facili-
tated that practice.”).
119 Tolson, supra note 12, at 862. R
120 LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 415 (2006).
121 Tolson, supra note 12, at 876. R
122 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009); see
also Tennant v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 567 U.S. ___ (2012), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-1184c1d3.pdf (holding that lower courts
should give more weight to the state’s legitimate policy objectives in deviating from
the rule of absolute population equality).
123 Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, Senators were not as constrained as
many scholars believe but were still responsive to state interests.  Bybee, supra note 83, R
at 525–26.  Similarly, the House also has some latitude regarding policy but they can-
not afford to ignore the states. See Tolson, supra note 12, at 862. R
124 Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT.
REV. 125, 177 (1995).  As Lessig noted:
Why the old categories were rendered political is a complicated story.  In
part it was because part of what these old limits rested upon had itself been
drawn into doubt—had been rendered contestable.  Not only the ideas of a
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intergovernmental tax immunity in New York v. United States,125 and to
determining the scope of federal regulation of the states in National
League of Cities v. Usury were all followed by cries of partisanship and
concerns over the Court’s legitimacy.126  This has led Lessig to argue
that, to avoid accusations of partisanship, the Court must “translate”
federalism in order to preserve something from the framing balance
in the current interpretive context.127
With respect to the judicial resolution of partisan gerrymander-
ing claims, the risk of politicization is acute and likely to occur.  The
integration of the political economy as a result of mass political par-
ties,128 much like the integration of the national economy prompting
Lessig’s theory of translation, makes it difficult to draw any type of
boundary between state and federal action.129  Similar to its recent
passive government in the face of crisis, and the ideas of laissez-faire, but also
some of the very premises of federalism itself.  What the Depression had
done was render these ideas fundamentally contestable, with the result that
decisions resting on one side or the other of this contest were rendered
political.  To draw these artificial lines to limit governmental power became
artificial; the effort, political.
Id. (footnote omitted).
125 326 U.S. 572, 574 (1946); see also Lessig, supra note 124, at 181–82 (discussing R
how the rule of McCulloch v. Maryland extended to state immunity from federal taxa-
tion but the doctrine later fell apart because of the inability of the Court to discern
when immunity was appropriate made them look political when such attempts were
made).
126 426 U.S. 833, 850 (1976); see also Lessig, supra note 124, at 184 (“[T]here could R
be no firm line that would divide proper from improper federal regulation; the line
instead was constantly shifting.  And if the line was constantly shifting, then the Court
couldn’t help but appear political in its shifting resolution of these federalism cases.”
(footnote omitted)); Tolson, supra note 34, at 1216. R
127 See Lessig, supra note 124, at 129 (“[Translation is] an effort to reconstruct R
something from the framing balance to be preserved in the current interpretative
context.”).
128 Kramer, supra note 23, at 1528–29 (arguing that political parties undermined R
the original system of federalism because they disincentivized the states to be watch
dogs of the federal government by connecting officials across levels of government);
Lessig, supra note 124, at 154–55 (arguing that current interpretive efforts have to R
“translate federalism” by preserving something from the framing balance because the
integration of the national economy makes absolute fidelity impossible since federal
and state economies are connected).
129 See Lessig, supra note 124, at 129. Compare Baker & Young, supra note 49, at 96 R
(“[Line drawing is part of the judicial endeavor, and despite the absence of bright
line rules] the perceived importance of the constitutional principle at stake has led
the judiciary to develop elaborate doctrinal structures through ‘reasoned judgment,’
even though the proper shape of those structures does not jump off the face of the
constitutional text and even though the doctrine has required constant elaboration,
adaptation, and even revision over time.”), with Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
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approach in its federalism case law, however, the Court can resolve at
least some of the issues created by gerrymandering by incrementally
changing the norms that govern the process of redistricting.  In order
to do so, the Court has to assess the broader implications of this feder-
alism benefit and how it affects the Court’s resolution of issues that
emerge in substantive areas that have some impact on congressional
redistricting.  This approach is preferable to constructing a new cause
of action that will ignore the benefits of gerrymandering and is
unlikely to capture the harm.130
Part III.A argues that because partisan gerrymandering sits at the
crossroads between two lines of precedent—election law and federal-
ism—the difficulty of reconciling these two areas makes it virtually
impossible to develop standards to directly regulate partisan gerry-
mandering.  But the failure of direct regulation does not put an end
to the questions surrounding the Court’s role.  As Part III.B shows, the
focus on manageable standards has detracted from deeper discussions
about the role that partisan gerrymandering plays in our system, a role
that naturally influences questions of justiciability.  Indeed, its federal-
ism benefits implicate foundational questions about our system of gov-
ernment by forcing us to revisit several important questions of
institutional design: whether mid-decade redistricting and at-large vot-
ing are approaches that can effectively convey voter preferences, and
relatedly, whether redistricting conducted by independent commis-
sions instead of state parties undermines the expression of these pref-
erences.  While direct judicial regulation of partisan gerrymandering
may be even less desirable than previously assumed for reasons dis-
cussed below, the Court can still play a role in promoting the federal-
ism benefits that underlie gerrymandering by resolving cases in
related areas in a way that strengthens the states’ ability to promote its
interests through gerrymandering.
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985) (“[The absence of bright lines is dispositive because
we doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled constitutional limitations on
the scope of Congress’[s] Commerce Clause powers over the States merely by relying
on a priori definitions of state sovereignty.  In part, this is because of the elusiveness of
objective criteria for ‘fundamental’ elements of state sovereignty, a problem we have
witnessed in the search for ‘traditional governmental functions.’”).
130 See Martinez v. Bush, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (purporting
to “[rely] heavily on those well-worn cases that analyzed vote dilution claims brought
by racial and ethnic groups under the Equal Protection Clause” in order to construct
a rule of law to govern the partisan gerrymandering claim); O’Lear v. Miller, 222 F.
Supp. 2d 862, 863 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (“[To succeed on a partisan gerrymandering
claim,] the plaintiffs must demonstrate that their interests will in fact be ‘entirely
ignored’ by their representatives.” (citation omitted)).
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A. Overcoming Standards, Overcoming Law: Federalism-Reinforcing
Gerrymandering and the Courts
The Supreme Court’s success in articulating standards to address
malapportionment and racial vote dilution have convinced many of
the justices that they can have similar success with respect to partisan
gerrymandering.  But what should be clear, at least if I have been per-
suasive, is that partisan gerrymandering is different because of its fed-
eralism benefits.  In light of this, the precedents in the federalism area
are obstacles to devising a governing standard for gerrymandering
claims.  The inquiry would have to alternate between determining
whether a redistricting plan is “excessively” partisan and assessing if
the gerrymander accurately distributes voter preferences in a way that
best represents the state’s policy positions.  The bright line rules that
the Court has been able to articulate in its election law jurisprudence
provide little guidance to answering either of these questions.  Nor do
any answers lie in its federalism cases, which have evolved into context
specific guides that focus on defining the outer limits of congressional
power.
In the election law area in particular, the Court has long strug-
gled with issues related to redistricting, which may help explain the
current impasse over gerrymandering.  In Colegrove v. Green,131 the
Court held that Illinois’s failure to reapportion its congressional dis-
tricts did not present a justiciable cause of action.132  The Court
switched gears less than two decades later, however, finding in Baker v.
Carr133 that the state’s failure to reapportion its state legislative dis-
tricts presented a potential Equal Protection Clause violation.134  Even
after the Court established the “one person, one vote” principle in
Reynolds v. Sims135 and its progeny, the doctrine was still unclear as to
whether redistricting based on partisanship raised the same constitu-
tional concerns as malapportionment.
This uncertainty persisted in part because the equipopulation
principle directly contributed to increased partisan gerrymander-
ing.136  In Gaffney v. Cummings, the Court alluded that such claims
131 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
132 Id. at 552.
133 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
134 Id. at 193–94.
135 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964).
136 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 785 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[A]n
uncompromising emphasis on numerical equality would serve to encourage and legit-
imate even the most outrageously partisan gerrymandering.”); Wells v. Rockefeller,
394 U.S. 542, 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1969) (“The fact of the matter is that the
rule of absolute equality is perfectly compatible with ‘gerrymandering’ of the worst
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 37  6-DEC-12 10:35
2012] benign  partisanship 431
might be justiciable, noting that, “A districting plan may create multi-
member districts perfectly acceptable under equal population stan-
dards, but invidiously discriminatory because they are employed ‘to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political ele-
ments of the voting population.’”137  This caveat was the first sign that
the Court was willing to punish partisan gerrymandering, speculating
that it would be able to ascertain when commonly used electoral
forms diminished the power of mutable groups.  A decade later, in
Davis v. Bandemer,138 the Court established a cause of action for parti-
san gerrymandering and framed “the claim [as being] that each politi-
cal group in a State should have the same chance to elect
representatives of its choice as any other political group,” a standard
that is somewhat similar to the approach that the Court had followed
in its racial gerrymandering cases.139  To establish invidious discrimi-
nation based on partisan affiliation under Davis, a political group
must show “the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will con-
sistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the politi-
cal process as a whole,” a standard that ultimately proved to be
unworkable in practice.140
For this reason, a mere eighteen years later in Vieth v. Jubelirer,141
a plurality of the Court held that partisan gerrymandering claims
should be non-justiciable.142  From Justice Kennedy’s perspective, ren-
dering partisan gerrymandering claims non-justiciable would create
legitimacy issues given the Court’s long history of intervening in this
area.143  Yet, he reached this conclusion by ignoring the federalism
sort.  A computer may grind out district lines which can totally frustrate the popular
will on an overwhelming number of critical issues.”).
137 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973).
138 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
139 Id. at 124.
140 Id. at 132.
141 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
142 As Justice Kennedy observed:
It is not in our tradition to foreclose the judicial process from the attempt to
define standards and remedies where it is alleged that a constitutional right
is burdened or denied.  Nor is it alien to the Judiciary to draw or approve
election district lines.  Courts, after all, already do so in many instances.  A
determination by the Court to deny all hopes of intervention could erode
confidence in the courts as much as would a premature decision to
intervene.
Id. at 309–10 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
143 For a review of that history, see Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 119 (detailing the Court’s
involvement in the political arena since Baker v. Carr to justify creating a cause of
action for partisan gerrymandering).
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implications of gerrymandering, an acknowledgement that would
draw the Court even deeper into resolving questions about how states
can best protect themselves from federal overreaching and might,
therefore, require a noninterventionist approach.
Caution is required because the Court has had similar difficulty
articulating bright line rules in cases dealing with the scope of Con-
gress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, leading the justices to
question for a time whether judicial review of federalism cases is
appropriate at all.144  For example, Maryland v. Wirtz,145 which took a
broad view of Congress’s power to extend the provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to state employees, was reversed less than
ten years later in National League of Cities v. Usury,146  which held that
the FLSA encroached on the traditional function of the state to regu-
late the wages and hours of its employees. National League of Cities was
overturned less than a decade later by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority147 on the grounds that the test established in the
former case, which focused on protecting “traditional” state functions
from federal power, had proven impossible to administer.  The Garcia
Court, over strong opposition from four justices, concluded that the
failure of this test illustrated that the political process is the best pro-
tection for preserving state sovereignty from congressional
overreaching.148
This series of 5-4 decisions regarding the scope of congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause made the Rehnquist Court
(and the Roberts Court, to some extent) more cautious going for-
ward, particularly in light of the early precedents expanding the scope
of congressional power in the years directly after the Founding and
144 Fallon, supra note 73, at 478 (“[A move to overrule Garcia and restore the R
regime of National League of Cities] especially if by a precarious 5-4 majority—would
risk making the Court look foolishly inconsistent.  It also would invite derisive specula-
tions about the Court’s proneness to flip-flop with turns of the political tide and raise
questions about the justices’ capacity to function as relatively apolitical umpires of
federal-state relations.”).
145 392 U.S. 183, 184 (1968) (upholding application of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to state operated schools and hospitals).
146 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
147 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
148 Id. at 554 (“[W]e are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the con-
stitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the ‘States as States’ is
one of process rather than one of result.  Any substantive restraint on the exercise of
Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this
basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the
national political process rather than to dictate a ‘sacred province of state auton-
omy.’” (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 233, 236 (1983))).
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following the New Deal.149  The Court has sacrificed its institutional
and political capital because of the schizophrenia with which it has
approached these cases.  Its position has alternated from circumscrib-
ing congressional authority after years of expanding it, relegating fed-
eralism questions to the political process out of frustration, and then,
shortly thereafter, reentering the fray again.  As a result, the costs of
exit are considerable because of the magnitude of the issues and the
inconsistency of the Court’s prior positions; as the New Deal period
illustrates, the Court will, at times, switch paths, but only when faced
with a threat to its legitimacy as an institution.150
To avoid losing its credibility, the Court will often retain a legal
principle that is outdated and inefficient in order to avoid expending
the political capital that comes with changing the rule.151  In an oft-
cited piece, Richard Fallon argued that rather than reversing prece-
dent, the Rehnquist Court opted to use sub-constitutional doctrines
such as Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity, official immu-
nity rules, and judge-made equitable doctrines in order to indirectly
advance federalism values and reshape Congress’s regulatory author-
ity.152  The Court took this approach, according to Fallon, in order to
149 Fallon, supra note 73, at 478 (“Rather than doubling back along the preceden- R
tial path, overruling Garcia, and returning to National League of Cities, the Court has so
far elected to take a different, much more modest route toward the protection of
federalism values.  In New York, it laid down the clear but limited rule that Congress
may not enact legislation under Article I that singles out state legislative bodies and
compels them to legislate.  In Printz, the Court extended New York’s noncommandeer-
ing principle to apply to state and local executive officials.” (footnotes omitted)).
150 Lessig, supra note 19, at 1265.  What this highlights is the dynamic of “increas- R
ing returns,” which focuses on specific patterns of timing and sequence and increases
the cost of switching from one alternative to another.  According to Paul Pierson:
In an increasing returns process, the probability of further steps along the
same path increases with each move down that path.  This is because the
relative benefits of the current activity compared to other possible options
increase over time.  To put it a different way, the costs of exit—of switching
to some previously plausible alternative—rise.
Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000).
151 Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 659 (2001) (“[P]ath dependence
theory suggests that stare decisis can lead to the maintenance of a legal principle that
is outdated and inefficient.  Over time, as a legal principle becomes more and more
entrenched, its failure to respond to changes in underlying conditions can result in
increasing inefficiency.”).
152 Fallon, supra note 73, at 431, 434 (referring to this as “precedential path R
dependence”).
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respect precedent and avoid the pitfalls that had characterized its ear-
lier attempts to articulate bright line rules.153
Similarly, the Court’s early commitments to finding a standard
for partisan gerrymandering, misguided as they were, have limited its
ability to entirely remove itself from this area altogether.154  In a little
over two decades, the Court has oscillated on the issue of justiciability,
sacrificing continuity and putting its institutional legitimacy at risk.155
Because of the repeated comparisons between partisan gerrymander-
ing and the Court’s past successes with the one person, one vote doc-
trine and the racial gerrymandering cases, the Court has effectively
written itself into a corner that it cannot get out of without repeating
the mistakes it has made in its federalism cases.
Because of this, the quest for manageable standards is likely to
continue into the near future, but, as Vieth v. Jubelirer illustrates, four
justices did not share Justice Kennedy’s confidence about the Court’s
ability to articulate those standards. Vieth concerned the Pennsylvania
congressional map, which had to adjust for a loss of two seats follow-
ing the 2000 census.  During redistricting, the Republican legislature
drew a skewed map to penalize Democrats for adopting plans unfavor-
able to Republicans in other states.156  In resolving the partisan gerry-
mandering claim, a plurality of the Court held that partisan
redistricting does not raise a cognizable constitutional claim, citing
the lack of manageable standards following the Court’s opinion in
Davis v. Bandemer.  In so holding, the plurality relied on the constitu-
tional text, which provides Congress with the power to “make or alter”
districts when partisanship has exceeded constitutional bounds.157
These justices also relied on historical evidence, noting that parties
have always tried to secure power disproportionate to their actual
support among the populace.158  And while the plurality ultimately
concluded that “excessive” partisan gerrymandering is unconstitu-
153 Id. at 436 (arguing that stare decisis and fear of public backlash has led the
Court to uphold cases such as Garcia and use alternative avenues to advance notions
of state sovereignty).
154 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311–12 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
155 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Looking for a Few Good Philosopher Kings: Political Gerry-
mandering as a Question of Institutional Competence, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (2011)
(arguing that courts should only resolve partisan gerrymandering claims in the most
egregious circumstances because their involvement threatens their institutional
legitimacy).
156 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272 (plurality opinion).
157 Id. at 275, 285–86.
158 Id. at 274–75.
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tional,159 it did not define “excessive” and made it clear that, unlike
race, excessive does not mean that a plan in which partisan motiva-
tions predominated is necessarily unconstitutional.160
Vieth places the Court in a difficult position.  While all nine jus-
tices agreed that partisan gerrymandering is incompatible with demo-
cratic principles, the justices split on the issue of what amount of
partisanship triggers a constitutional violation, and, most importantly,
whether the Court is capable of determining when that level has been
reached.161  Part of the difficulty stems from previous cases holding
that incumbent protection is a legitimate redistricting objective, and
reconciling this valid and constitutional use of politics with “excessive”
gerrymandering has proven to be difficult.162
The distinction between “politics as usual” as a traditional redis-
tricting criterion and “excessive” politics as a constitutional violation
has significant implications for the justiciability of partisan gerryman-
dering claims.  The plurality suggested that the inherent difficulty in
making this assessment renders gerrymandering more suitable for reg-
ulation by the political branches.  Even if one disagrees with this posi-
tion, however, the answer will not be found in framing partisan
gerrymandering solely as a constitutional evil,163 or, alternatively, as
having a bright side,164 both of which ignore the complex nature of
gerrymandering.  While simultaneously “inconsistent with democratic
principles” and “ordinary and lawful,” Vieth implicitly acknowledges
that partisan gerrymandering has some benefits that must be factored
159 Id. at 279–81, 283 (discussing Davis and noting that although the case
“involved the ne plus ultra of partisan manipulation,” the lack of manageable stan-
dards has led courts to deny relief in cases involving redistricting plans that embrace
“extreme partisan discrimination, bizarrely shaped districts, and disproportionate
results”).
160 Id. at 293.
161 Eight of the nine Vieth justices endorsed the position that partisan gerryman-
dering is unconstitutional only if used excessively. See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S.  947,
952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (making this point).  Justice Stevens was the only
justice to suggest that all use of partisanship in districting is unconstitutional. Vieth,
541 U.S. at 320–21 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440–41 (2006); see also Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983).
163 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781,
783 (2005) (exploring whether there are judicially manageable standards to regulate
partisan gerrymandering and “taking as a given” that excessive pursuit of partisan
advantage is unconstitutional).
164 See THOMAS L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETI-
TIVE ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA 13 (2008) (arguing that competitive districts
optimize the number of losers); see also Kang, supra note 22, at 444. R
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into whether the Court is equipped to assess its constitutionality.165
This acknowledgment makes it difficult for the Court to proceed as it
has in the past—through direct regulation.166
Moreover, once one considers some of the proposals for direct
regulation made by scholars, it is not clear that these approaches
would result in fewer false positives, or, in other words, invalidate ger-
rymanders that have federalism benefits and validate gerrymanders
that are “excessive.”167  Mitchell Berman, for example, argues that
partisanship can be boiled down to a scalar concept that allows courts
to determine if too much partisanship has permeated the process.168
According to this methodology, courts would focus on what the parti-
san makeup of the districts would have been absent the excessive par-
tisan redistricting as opposed to what would be a fair outcome, which
is the approach that many commentators endorse.169  Berman con-
cedes “the extraordinary unlikelihood, and perhaps impossibility, of
ever learning just what the legislature really would have done had it
not considered partisanship,” but contends that this problem could be
overcome by adopting instrumental rules that promote the
counterfactual baseline understanding of excessive partisanship.170
165 See Cox, 542 U.S. at 952 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166 See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 400–01 (using section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
regulate partisan gerrymandering).
167 Although this Article only focuses on a couple of examples, scholars have pro-
posed and rejected a number of ways to regulate gerrymandering. See Richard G.
Niemi, The Swing Ratio as a Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering, in POLITICAL GERRYMAN-
DERING AND THE COURTS 171, 176 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990) (“[The test should
consider] whether the swing ratio associated with a particular plan is particularly low
in comparison with historical experience in the jurisdiction in question.”); see also
Gary King, Representation Through Legislative Redistricting: A Stochastic Model, 33 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 787, 788 (1989) (“[One possibility is to use the] district-level theoretical
model of the process by which partisan electoral swings and incumbency voting mod-
ify democratic representation and partisan bias [developed here].”); Daniel H. Low-
enstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest:
Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 55–62 (1985) (rejecting proportionality and
symmetry as potential conceptions of how votes and seats in legislative election should
correlate); Richard G. Niemi, The Relationship Between Votes and Seats: The Ultimate Ques-
tion in Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REV. 185, 207–08 (1985) (arguing that a
random district baseline would pose too many difficulties if applied by the Supreme
Court).
168 Berman, supra note 163, at 820 (“This effort to identify the range of distinct
ways in which partisanship can be intelligibly conceptualized in scalar terms . . . pro-
vides a powerful framework for critically assessing extant judicial and scholarly argu-
ments that purport to show that the judiciary could not manageably police the
practice of partisan gerrymandering.”).
169 Id. at 824.
170 Id. at 829.
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Because of its focus on capturing “excessive” partisanship as mea-
sured against a counterfactual baseline, this approach makes some
allowance for the beneficial use of partisanship, but it still runs into a
problem of arbitrary application.171  In other words, how is a court to
determine the appropriate percentage by which a party can increase
its electoral share without running afoul of the Constitution?  In the
2003 Texas redistricting, for example, the fact that the Republicans
won sixty-five percent of the congressional seats although they only
obtained fifty-eight percent of the vote in statewide races might indi-
cate “excessiveness,” or it may not.172  Arguably, the counterfactual
does not answer this question, nor does it explicitly take into account
the federalism interest of gerrymandering, which might otherwise jus-
tify the fifty-eight/sixty-five split.173  Decision rules that focus on the
end result ignore the state interests that are promoted in the process
of gerrymandering.
Similarly, Nicholas Stephanopoulos argues that courts can assess
whether a given partisan gerrymander violates the Constitution by
focusing on the degree to which certain metrics, such as race and
wealth, are dispersed throughout a district.174  This concept, which
Stephanopoulos refers to as spatial diversity, would invalidate only the
most extreme gerrymanders, which arguably can be addressed
through indirect regulation without having to make a value judgment
as to what a fair outcome would be.175  In fact, Stephanopoulos con-
cedes that the Supreme Court, through existing doctrine, has already
done a good job of policing egregious gerrymanders that are not spa-
tially homogenous without any formal metrics.176
171 Id. at 844 (conceding that his approach is arbitrary, but noting that this is not a
barrier).
172 LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 413 (2006).
173 See Berman, supra note 163, at 843 (noting the separation of powers concerns
that emerge from an erroneous judicial invalidation of a challenged scheme).
174 Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1903, 1937
(2012) (outlining metrics such as race, ethnicity, age, income, education, profession,
marital status, and housing in order to calculate spatial diversity scores that will enable
the Court to police districts which are uneven with respect to these criteria).
175 See, e.g., LULAC, 548 U.S. at 400–01 (2006) (using Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act to invalidate a state’s attempt to replace a dismantled district with one that
was not spatially diverse).
176 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 174, at 1909 (“The Court’s decision [in Vieth]
to uphold Pennsylvania’s plan was also prudent since the state’s districts were not, on
average, particularly heterogeneous.  In [LULAC], likewise, the Court was probably
right to prefer Texas’s old Twenty-Third District to the new Twenty-Fifth District
because the former’s Hispanic population was more spatially homogeneous.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 44  6-DEC-12 10:35
438 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
For the most part, the legal scholarship has been deficient in
acknowledging that partisan gerrymandering has been unregulated,
not only because of a lack of manageable standards, but also because
partisan gerrymandering is different from the other “evils” that the
Court normally encounters.177  It is true that partisan gerrymandering
has been used to insulate incumbents from competition, making it
deserving of at least some of the criticism it receives,178 but it is also a
political tool that can inure to the benefit of the states and historically
disenfranchised minorities.179  In fact, in many cases, racial gerryman-
dering and partisan gerrymandering are virtually indistinguishable.180
Moreover, unlike other “evils,” partisan gerrymandering is, to
some extent, self-policing, making any judicial involvement appear
inherently political.181  As Justice O’Connor observed in Davis, gerry-
mandering is “a self-limiting enterprise” because “overambitious gerry-
mander[s]” can lead to disaster at the polls where a legislative
majority weakens too many safe seats in order to extend its dominance
and defeat opponents.182  This also weighs against its justiciability, not
only because the threshold of “excessive” partisanship will rarely be
177 For a notable exception, see Briffault, supra note 22. R
178 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law,
and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 506–07, 509–10 (2004); Heather
K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1667-
68 (2001); Jamal Greene, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under the Elections Clause, 114
YALE L.J. 1021, 1026 (2005); Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 614; Issacharoff & Karlan, R
supra note 26, at 543; Ellen D. Katz, Resurrecting the White Primary, 153 U. PA. L. REV. R
325, 373–80 (2004); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (noting that gerrymandering may infringe the First
Amendment rights of voters); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 128 (1986) (noting
that redistricting can produce safe districts).
179 BRUNELL, supra note 164.
180 See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 239–40 (2001) (finding that race did not
predominate where the legislature utilized mostly partisan criteria); see also LULAC,
548 U.S. at 400 (2006) (raising partisan gerrymandering and Voting Rights Act
claims); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 954 (1996) (raising partisan gerrymandering and
Voting Rights Act claims); Davis, 478 U.S. at 110 (1986) (same).
181 See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 540 (1997) (“[T]here are limits to how much partisan advantage gerry-
mandering can produce [because the disadvantaged party is not entirely power-
less].”).  Given the inherently political nature of redistricting and its federalism
benefits, the fact that it is self-policing may distinguish it from other instances in
which legislators act in an anti-majoritarian way and therefore judicial review is not
only justified, but required. Cf. id. at 534, 540 (agreeing with commentators who
“doubt whether gerrymandering constitutes a very large antimajoritarian problem”
but contending that it should still be justiciable because gerrymandering “has nothing
to commend it—the practice is entrenchment, pure and simple”).
182 Davis, 478 U.S. at 152 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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reached, but also because judicial involvement may come long after
the gerrymander has lost its effectiveness.183
That the Court has been stymied in developing standards to
address partisan gerrymandering directly does not mean that this fed-
eralism benefit cannot be promoted through doctrines that govern
other redistricting related areas of the case law.  As the next section
shows, the federalism benefits of partisan gerrymandering may ulti-
mately be the tipping point for determining not only whether judicial
review is desirable, but also the form that judicial review should take.
B. The Structural Implications of Federalism-Reinforcing Gerrymandering:
Reassessing the Existing Paradigm
Because the legal scholarship and the courts have not considered
the federalism benefits that emerge from partisan gerrymandering,
there also has not been any measured study of how this benefit has
broader implications for our electoral system.  As this part shows,
encouraging partisan gerrymandering to promote this interest could
also mean: embracing more mid-decade redistricting by state legisla-
tures; reconsidering the role of at-large voting schemes in our system;
removing the power to draw redistricting plans from independent
commissions; and developing rules that promote strong state political
parties.  Even if the Supreme Court is unable to develop standards to
regulate partisan gerrymandering directly, its jurisprudence still can
play a role in strengthening or promoting these factors as a means of
protecting the federalism interest underlying partisan gerrymander-
ing in ways I discuss below.
1. Using Mid-Decade Redistricting and At-Large Elections to
Gauge Voter Preferences
One of the main criticisms of partisan gerrymandering is that it
undermines the ability of voters to hold elected officials responsible
for policy decisions by manipulating district lines.  Mid-decade redis-
tricting and at-large voting schemes provide an accountability mecha-
nism that ensures that the preferences of a majority of the voters
continue to be represented in the state’s congressional delegation.
With respect to mid-decade redistricting, the Supreme Court has held
that it is not per se unconstitutional, but the Court has penalized the
state for making its representatives less accountable where the state
dismantled certain majority-minority districts when the representa-
183 See Berman, supra note 163, at 843 (noting the separation of powers concerns
that emerge from an erroneous judicial invalidation of a challenged scheme).
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tional preferences of the residents were inimical to those of the
state.184  As the Court’s actions indicate, mid-decade redistricting is
not about shoring up vulnerable incumbents; rather, it can help guar-
antee that there is partisan congruence between the congressional
delegation and the voters.
Despite its potential benefits, scholars still view mid-decade redis-
tricting with skepticism.  Adam Cox, for example, has argued that
there should be a temporal floor on redistricting in order to “pro-
mote[ ] beneficial uncertainty” and “randomize[ ] control over the
redistricting process” so as to make it “less likely that redistricting will
occur under conditions favoring partisan gerrymandering.”185
Because there is value in redistricting that corrects for variations in
voting behavior over time, forcing a state to adhere to a redistricting
scheme that does not map onto voter preferences undermines the
structural protection that states receive from their ability to gerryman-
der.  This cost might undermine any of the benefits of reduced parti-
san bias that would accompany a rule limiting redistricting to once a
decade, particularly since: 1) it is not clear that the process of mid-
decade redistricting would be any more polarized than redistricting
that occurs once a decade, and 2) some level of partisan bias at the
institutional level is inevitable in ensuring that the state’s delegation is
an adequate reflection of voter preferences.186
In Texas, for example, the new Republican majority redistricted
after decades of enduring pro-Democratic gerrymanders, and, in
2002, a court-drawn map forced Republicans to compete under a plan
that did not accurately reflect their political power statewide.  Notably,
under Cox’s definition of partisan fairness, this outcome is likely
acceptable so long as there is symmetry in the votes-seats relationship
between the parties under the court-drawn plan.187  But in light of the
arguments presented here, it is clear that the quest for partisan fair-
ness should be decoupled from arguments in favor of eliminating
mid-decade redistricting.  Arguably, the court-drawn plan may have
184 LULAC, 548 U.S. at 415 (2006); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting,
and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1185, 1198 (2007) (“One cannot gainsay the fact
that the accountability function of elections is rendered ineffective if redistricters
prior to the election can remove from the district the individuals most likely to vote
against the representative.”).
185 Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 755
(2004).
186 See id. at 764, 767 n.60 (defining partisan fairness as the absence of partisan
bias but noting that this conception of bias “cannot . . . be measured meaningfully at
the legislature-wide level for state legislatures or at the congressional-delegation level
for Congress”).
187 Id. at 766.
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lacked partisan bias as Cox defines it, but the plan gave the Democrats
more seats than they were otherwise entitled based on their statewide
percentage of the vote.  This introduced a different type of bias (mis-
representation of the party’s actual electoral strength) that might be
equally as problematic as the partisan bias, or the lack of symmetry
between votes and seats, of which Cox complains. Replacing a biased
pro-Democratic plan mid-decade with a biased pro-Republican plan,
but one that more accurately reflects the distribution of power state-
wide, is less problematic than if a growing electoral minority sought to
use mid-decade redistricting to entrench itself.
Allowing parties to keep a pulse on the policy and partisan prefer-
ences of voters may also justify abandoning districted elections in
favor of a more controversial electoral scheme: at-large voting.  At-
large elections, in which all participants vote for all of the open
seats,188 have long been criticized as denying minorities the opportu-
nity to elect their preferred candidate because, in the presence of
racial bloc voting, white voters would always be able to elect all of the
representatives.189  Indeed, the factual basis for the seminal case of
Thornburg v. Gingles was a challenge to an at-large election scheme
under the renewed Voting Rights Act.  However, if the House also
plays a role in protecting state interests as I argue in Part II, then an
at-large election may be one mechanism to ensure that the state’s con-
gressional delegation is truly representative of the policy preferences
of a majority of the voters in the state.190
At-large voting may also address concerns raised by partisan ger-
rymandering that occurs in swing states or states with politically mod-
188 States are required by law to have elections for Congress in single member
districts, but if a state’s delegation was elected in at-large election, then all voters
would vote for all of the seats.
189 See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 86–87 (1986) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (“[In a single at-large election in a jurisdiction of 1000 voters of whom thirty
percent are black,] white voters could elect all the representatives even if black voters
turned out in large numbers and voted for one and only one candidate.”); see also
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982) (holding that Georgia’s at-large system for
electing members of the Burke County Board of Commissioners violated the Four-
teenth Amendment). But see id. at 616–617 (“[At-large voting schemes and multi-
member districts are] not unconstitutional per se [but can] violate the Fourteenth
Amendment if ‘conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial discrimi-
nation.’” (citations omitted)).
190 See ZAGARRI, supra note 25, at 129 (discussing the controversy over redistricting
during the nineteenth century and noting that proponents of the at-large method
believed that it was more appropriate than districted elections because congressmen
“represented the state as a community” and so “[a]ll the people in a state . . . should
be able to vote for all of the state’s congressmen.”).
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erate leadership and voters.  In these contexts, it may be difficult to
distinguish federalism-reinforcing partisan gerrymandering from par-
tisan gerrymandering that is designed to entrench an electoral minor-
ity.  Nebraska, for example, has a delegation that is entirely
Republican and its voters are overwhelmingly Republican and con-
servative.  Partisan gerrymandering has obvious federalism potential
in this context.
In contrast, partisan gerrymandering in swing states like Florida
could have the exact opposite result where voter support is almost
evenly split between the two major parties, and there is a split House
delegation in which Republicans maintain a majority partially through
gerrymandering.  Assessing whether gerrymandering promotes the
interests of the state in this type of political environment is probably
impossible,191 but an at-large voting scheme would be a more accurate
and authentic reflection of voter preferences because a majority of the
voters would elect a majority of the representatives.
At-large voting is not without risk, particularly to voters from his-
torically disenfranchised minority groups.  The primary concern
raised by both increased mid-decade redistricting and at-large election
schemes to select congressional representatives is that votes from
these groups will be diluted, as is what occurred to Latinos in Texas
during the 2003 mid-decade redistricting, or to African-Americans in
Burke County, Georgia, which, until 1982, used an at-large election to
select the members of its governing Board of Commissioners.  There
are two plausible ways to address concerns about the rights of racial
minorities in both at-large and mid-decade redistricting scenarios:
using an alternate voting scheme in the context of an at-large election
designed to promote “authentic” minority representation and robust
enforcement of statutory doctrines designed to protect minority vot-
ers, specifically section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.192
191 An example of how the politics of swing states complicate the federalism analy-
sis in the gerrymandering context is the fact that in 2009, Governor Crist, a Republi-
can, supported the bailout and solicited funds for Florida although all of the
Republicans in Florida’s congressional delegation voted against it. See Teddy Davis,
Florida’s Crist Hammered for Backpedalling on Obama’s Stimulus, ABC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2009,
1:06 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/11/floridas-crist-hammered-
for-backpedalling-on-obamas-stimulus/.
192 Guy-Uriel Charles defines “authentic” racial representation as an “attempt[ ]
to maximize the autonomy and agency of voters” by promoting the election of a “rep-
resentative . . . that is substantially the choice of the relevant electorate  with minimal
interference by the State.”  Charles, supra note 184, at 1193.
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a. Protecting Minority Groups: Cumulative Voting in At-
Large Elections
One possible alternate voting scheme, advanced by Lani Guinier,
would allow voters to cumulate their votes in a modified at-large elec-
tion scenario.  Unlike single member districts in which minorities are
limited to exercising their political power in the districts that have
been drawn for them, this approaches recognizes “both the existence
and intensity of minority voter preference” by allowing for potentially
greater representation than that provided by single member district-
ing, depending on the intensity of the minority group’s prefer-
ences.193  In a modified at-large election,
[C]andidates would run jurisdiction-wide, but the threshold for
election would be reduced from 51% to something less.  In the case
of a four person at-large council, the threshold for election would
be 21% [which is the minimal number of votes necessary to elect a
candidate].  Voters would each be given the same number of votes
as open seats (four in this case) that they could distribute by their
choice among the competing candidates.  If black voters are a politi-
cally cohesive interest constituency, they might use all four of their
votes on one candidate.  In a 100 voter jurisdiction, where each
black voter gave all four of her votes to one candidate, a 25% black
minority could elect a representative.  The intensity of their inter-
ests and their political cohesion would ensure black voters the abil-
ity to elect at least one representative.194
Under this system, African-American voters can still elect their
candidate of choice despite the absence of a majority-minority “safe”
district, but unlike the single member district, it avoids promoting the
interests of African-Americans at the expense of political allies.195
Moreover, cumulative voting in an at-large election scenario may be a
more accurate gauge of the intensity of voter preferences because it
permits minority groups to throw all of their votes behind a preferred
candidate.  This scenario would actually allow African-Americans to be
a party in the political system in its entirety, whereas majority-minority
districts tend to remove African-American candidates from electoral
competition with whites, which can ultimately affect the degree to
193 LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRE-
SENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 94 (1994).
194 Id. at 94–95.
195 Id. at 95 (“The modified at-large system encourages black representation with-
out disabling or diluting the votes of potential allies.  By contrast, the single-member
districting approach may require submerging Latino voters within majority-black dis-
tricts or white Democratic voters within majority-white Republican districts.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 50  6-DEC-12 10:35
444 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
which the political interests of African-Americans are adequately rep-
resented on the national stage through the state’s delegation.196
b. Protecting Minority Groups: Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act
Cumulative voting schemes notwithstanding, increased mid-dec-
ade redistricting could have a deleterious effect on minority rights
and threaten to erase any gains made by minorities in the prior elec-
tion cycle.  Robust enforcement of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
could prevent these groups from falling victim to the partisan
extremes that redistricting often conjures in political elites.  Section 2
forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial
or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color” and protects minority interests from ger-
rymanders that impermissibly burden the ability of these groups to
elect their candidate of choice.197  Since “the ability to elect one’s can-
didate of choice” is a partisan concept in and of itself, section 2’s focus
196 Id. at 96.  Guinier notes that because only a bare majority is needed to elect a
representative in a single member district, “black voters are not encouraged to partici-
pate actively in the political process because a low turnout still benefits the incum-
bent.” Id. These voters “have no mechanism to encourage representatives from the
majority-white districts . . . to represent their interests.” Id. Guinier’s proposal is not
the only way in which minority interests can be protected in an at-large voting
scheme.  As Richard Briffault points out, single transferable voting (STV) is another
alternative that can protect minority interests in an at-large election:
Like cumulative voting, STV dispenses with single-member districting and
returns to multi-member districts or at-large elections.  But instead of
allowing voters to cumulate votes behind one candidate, STV provides a
preference voting system.  The voter casts one ballot but can rank candidates
to reflect the voter’s relative preferences among them.  Ranking candidates
in order of preference enables votes that would be “wasted” on one candi-
date to be transferred to another candidate.  A vote can be ‘wasted’ if it is
‘surplus’—that is, a vote cast for a candidate who would win without it—or if
it is cast for a losing candidate.  STV saves ‘wasted’ votes by providing for
their transfer to the next ranked candidate on a voter’s ballot.  STV thus
increases the proportion of voters who vote for a winning candidate, and
increases the likelihood that the voter will be represented by a legislator of
his or her choosing.  The vote-transfer feature of STV benefits electoral
minorities, even in the face of the firm opposition of the majority.
Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 418, 435–36 (1995).
197 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).  In the context of state legislative redistricting,
I argue that the judicially created safe harbor, allowing states to deviate from the rule
of equipopulation for policy reasons, has contributed to gerrymandering that is exces-
sive. See  also Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
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on race, as opposed to partisanship, is not a barrier to regulating ger-
rymandering that occurs for partisan, rather than racial, reasons.198
Gerrymandering that subordinates a legitimate minority interest,
defined here as having a cognizable section 2 claim, to countervailing
partisan considerations crosses the line into the “excessive” partisan
gerrymandering that most of the justices agree would violate the Con-
stitution.199  To emphasize this point, LULAC was about the ability of
a historically disenfranchised minority to participate and aggregate
political power in a way that expressed their preferences, a right that
exists under section 2 and must be balanced against the state’s author-
ity to gerrymander.  Although the Supreme Court declined to find
that the plan as a whole was unconstitutional, it held that the disman-
tling of the majority-Latino Twenty-Fifth District violated section 2
because the legislature impermissibly subordinated the ability of the
Latinos in the district to effectively aggregate their political power and
elect their candidate of choice to its interest in protecting an increas-
ingly unpopular incumbent.200  The incumbent, Henry Bonilla, had
been steadily losing Latino support and, during the redistricting,
Republicans shifted some of the Latino voters out of the Twenty-Fifth
District and added white voters to shore up his support.  The Court
concluded that because Latinos were set to elect the candidate of
their choice pre-redistricting and had indicated their disapproval of
the incumbent by not voting for him, the new plan violated section 2
because it took away their opportunity to exercise an effective vote just
as they were about to use it.201
198 See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2001) (suggesting that evi-
dence of voter behavior would be sufficient to defeat a racial gerrymandering claim
because such evidence would show that partisanship, not race, predominated in the
drawing of district lines); LaRoque v. Holder, 650 F.3d 777, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(noting that the federal government denied Voting Rights Act preclearance to a
county’s plan to change from partisan to nonpartisan elections because the change
will make it more difficult for minorities to identify Democratic candidates); see also
Charles, supra note 184, at 1194 (“[T]he framework of the [s]ection 2 inquiry not
only assumes but requires explicitly a political cohesiveness for which race is ‘the only
common index.’”).
199 See Charles, supra note 184, at 1207 (“[One possible interpretation of the
Court’s holding in LULAC v. Perry is that the] State intentionally discriminates against
voters (of color?) where the State intentionally deprives them of an electoral benefit
to which they would otherwise be entitled for reasons that are not constitutionally
permissible.”); see also id. at 1208 (noting that the State’s intent does not have to be
racial intent but can encompass a broader intent “to deprive the group of an electoral
opportunity”).
200 LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423 (2006).
201 Id. at 423–24, 440–41; see also Charles, supra note 184, at 1195 (arguing that
Bonilla was arguably the “least authentic Latino representative” despite the fact that
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The fact that the gerrymandering of the Twenty-Fifth District was
instituted just as Latinos were set to exercise their hard won political
power was dispositive in finding that the state had violated section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, despite the constitutionality of relying on parti-
san considerations in redistricting more generally.  These considera-
tions were clearly “excessive” when they trumped effective
participation and the right of a historically disenfranchised group to
successfully utilize the political process.  In fact, Justice Kennedy con-
ceded that incumbency protection, an inherently partisan considera-
tion, can be a legitimate factor in districting, but observed that
context matters:
If the justification for incumbency protection is to keep the constit-
uency intact so the officeholder is accountable for promises made
or broken, then the protection seems to accord with concern for
the voters.  If, on the other hand, incumbency protection means
excluding some voters from the district simply because they are
likely to vote against the officeholder, the change is to benefit the
officeholder, not the voters.  By purposely redrawing lines around
those who opposed Bonilla, the state legislature took the latter
course.  This policy, whatever its validity in the realm of politics, can-
not justify the effect on Latino voters.202
Although Latinos were able to successfully challenge the partisan
dismantling of the Twenty-Fifth District under section 2, this does not
mean that every minority group is guaranteed to prevail where they
cannot elect their preferred candidate. LULAC also illustrates that,
where citizens have not effectively aggregated their preferences, parti-
sanship can trump a weak section 2 claim.  The district court found
that residents of the Twenty-Fourth District, an influence district
where African-Americans constituted less than fifty percent of the vot-
ing age population, did not have a cognizable section 2 claim because
there was insufficient evidence that they could elect their candidate of
choice under the old plan.203  In support of this finding, the court
relied on testimony that the district was drawn for a white Democrat,
Martin Frost; the fact that Frost had no opposition in any of his pri-
mary elections since his incumbency began; and the Twenty-Fourth
District’s demographic similarity to another district where an African-
American candidate lost when he ran against a white candidate.204
he is Latino and was elected from a majority-Latino district because he was “demon-
strably ideologically opposed to the ideological preferences of Latino voters in the
region and . . . they have repeatedly repudiated him in very clear terms”).
202 LULAC, 548 U.S. at 441.
203 Id. at 443.
204 Id. at 444.
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The Supreme Court upheld this finding in part because it was not
clear that the African-Americans in the Twenty-Fourth District had
obtained the same level of political power in their district as the Lati-
nos in the Twenty-Fifth District because of the lack of viable alterna-
tives to Frost.  Frost had been the representative for many years, and
he did not face any competition at either the primary or general elec-
tion stage.  As a result, there was no evidence that the use of partisan-
ship in dismantling the district was “excessive” because there was no
way for the Court to judge if the African-Americans in the Twenty-
Fourth District genuinely preferred Frost to all others.205
Even if one disagrees with the disparate outcomes of the Twenty-
Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Districts, LULAC remains important because
the Court was able to make a plausible determination about the 2003
mid-decade redistricting plan’s effect on minority political power
while respecting the overall partisan purpose of the plan, which was to
ensure that the congressional delegation reflected the overall distribu-
tion of power statewide.206  Section 2 is a perfect fix by no means, but
at the very least, it can serve as a check on the partisanship that will
accompany increased mid-decade redistricting and the use of at-large
voting schemes.207
2. Removing Redistricting Authority from Independent
Commissions
Prominent scholars have proposed that creating nonpartisan
intermediate institutions would be an important way to mitigate the
incumbent entrenching effects of partisan gerrymandering.  Several
205 See also Charles, supra note 184, at 1199 (“The challenge for the plaintiffs chal-
lenging the dismantling of District 24 is that they are asking the Court to restore an
incumbent-protection gerrymander without sufficient justification.”).
206 The problem is that several of the justices gave little weight to this interest,
finding that the partisanship in the plan defeats any claim of legitimacy. LULAC, 548
U.S. at 448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opinion joined by
Justice Breyer).
207 Even the robust enforcement of section 2 will not completely eliminate all the
potential threats to minority rights because, in many ways, LULAC, although it uses
race to limit politics, is not a complete victory for racial representation. See Charles,
supra note 184, at 1210 (“Had Justice Kennedy permitted Latino voters to hold on to
District 25 as a majority-Latino district and add District 23 as a majority-Latino district,
then [LULAC] could be understood as an unqualified endorsement of racial repre-
sentation.”); see also Charles, supra note 22, at 638 (warning against the use of race to R
police politics).  But it is certainly a start that can lead us in the direction of better
representation for groups that balance dual identities in our electoral system: a politi-
cal identity, which involves a common ideology, as well as a racial identity, which
carries with it the burden of a legacy of discrimination.
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of these scholars have argued that redistricting commissions are key to
controlling the tendency toward political self-entrenchment that
occurs when elites draw district lines.208  Notably, Chris Elmendorf has
proposed that this incumbent entrenchment dynamic can be coun-
tered by an advisory committee (“AC”) responsible for “investigating
problems, drafting remedial legislation, and submitting its bills for
closed-rule votes of the legislature or, in jurisdictions that recognize
the referendum, a vote of the people.”209  Elmendorf concedes that
elected officials often have better information than voters but argues
that an AC can help low information voters hold these elected officials
politically accountable.210
Once one accounts for the federalism interest that emerges from
gerrymandering, however, it is clear that Elmendorf’s model AC, as
well as the other types of independent and nonpartisan commissions
proposed in the scholarship, could deprive states of the ability to pro-
tect their interests through redistricting.  The AC could undermine
this function by placing redistricting in the hands of individuals who
are often as politically polarized as elected officials but have less infor-
mation and are less accountable to the electorate.211  Indeed, low
information, or rationally ignorant, voters can promote their policy
preferences by using the partisan label as a shortcut in choosing their
congressional representatives.212  In our current system, the low-infor-
208 See Pildes, supra note 22, at 277–83; see also Christopher S. Elmendorf, Represen- R
tation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1366 (2005); Issacharoff, supra note 13, at 614. R
209 Elmendorf, supra note 208, at 1371.
210 Id. at 1380 (“[The AC’s authority would focus on agenda setting as opposed to
regulation, and as such, would have the power to] investigate election law problems,
to develop candidate reforms, and to trigger a legislative or popular vote on its
reforms.”).
211 Id. at 1408–09 (“[The commission] might be drawn at random from the pool
of former elected officials and high-level political appointees, . . . [or] by setting aside
equal number of seats for members of each major party; . . . [or through an] indepen-
dent nominating commission, or even in a constitutional court.”).  The problem with
each of these proposals is that the partisanship becomes an issue of degree rather
than being removed from the process of selecting members of the commission. See
also Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to Establish
Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 333 (2007) (arguing that
popular initiatives should be used to create redistricting commissions where the legis-
lature will not act); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institu-
tions, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 144 (2010) (“[Elections should be run by] state
election management bodies that are insulated from partisan politics.”).
212 See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574–75 (2000) (suggesting
that the partisan label serves a signaling function to voters); Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 636 (1996) (same); see also Christopher S.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 55  6-DEC-12 10:35
2012] benign  partisanship 449
mation voter is not without informational cues that serve as a viable
alternative to delegating redistricting authority to independent
commissions.
The fact that the commission can have the same partisan intent as
the legislature does little to lessen the Supreme Court’s burden of try-
ing to determine when partisan gerrymandering has crossed the line
into the “excessive” gerrymandering that violates the Constitution.213
Moreover, even if we disregard this risk of partisanship on the
grounds that Elmendorf’s model AC likely will be less partisan than
elected officials,214 the AC will still be a somewhat partisan entity that
lacks the power to directly promote the interests of the state and can
countermand the state legislature’s ability to do so.  Indeed, in many
ways, Elmendorf’s model AC seems to function as another agency or
branch, which could further push our system of federalism out of
whack.215
For example, the AC’s authority to trigger closed rule legislative
votes on its proposals could undermine the state’s ability to craft a
cohesive legislative agenda that it can then promote through its con-
gressional delegation.  A state’s congressional delegation helps the
state to shape, impede, or promote the implementation of federal pol-
icy as it affects the country as a polity and the particular state.  A
Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Districting for a Low-Information Electorate, 121 YALE L.J.
1846, 1848 (2012) (“Having a feel for the ideology and past performance of Demo-
crats and Republicans as a whole is usually enough to determine which candidate to
support even if you know nothing about the candidates beyond their party affilia-
tion[, but this shortcut is insufficient for primary elections].”).  To be fair, because
the AC would be created as a matter of state law, the state could try to craft a scheme
that would address concerns about accountability and polarization, but it is unclear if
the typical low-information voter would be able to discern who to hold responsible for
decisions made by the AC without having the party designation to use as a shortcut.
See Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance,
Political Parties, and Election Law, (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2010115 [hereinafter Informing Consent].
213 See, e.g., Olga Pierce & Jeff Larson, How Democrats Fooled California’s Redistrict-
ing Commission, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 21, 2011, 3:38 PM), http://www.propublica.org/
article/how-democrats-fooled-californias-redistricting-commission.
214 See Pildes, supra note 22, at 80–81 (arguing that the important question is R
whether intermediate institutions are better at institutional design than partisan
actors).
215 See Elmendorf, supra note 208, at 1414 (“[T]he AC should have authority to
trigger closed-rule legislative votes or popular referenda on its proposals, [but such
power should be limited in frequency in order to] keep the advisory body from
unduly impinging on legislative agenda-setting.”); see also Christopher S. Elmendorf,
Advisory Counterparts to Constitutional Courts, 56 DUKE L.J. 953, 1015 (2007) (arguing
that the AC should have authority to trigger closed-rule legislative votes or popular
referenda on its proposals).
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united delegation can help protect the state from federal overreach-
ing by joining with other delegations to form a governing majority
and promote interests that are specific to the state during the process
of legislative decision-making.216  An AC that can push its own legisla-
tive agenda could unduly interfere with this process and undermine
the constitutional protections that enable states to protect themselves
in this manner.
In order to protect the federalism benefits of partisan gerryman-
dering, at the very least, a court reviewing a redistricting plan drawn
by an independent or advisory commission would have to subject the
plan to more scrutiny than it otherwise would have had the plan been
drawn by state legislators.  But even this minor fix would require a
completely different approach than courts have taken post-Vieth.
For example, in Shapiro v. Berger, the district court acknowledged
that Vieth leaves open the possibility that some future claimant might
be able to establish unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, but
that such a claim would have to “surmount two extremely high barri-
ers” including “the lack of comprehensive and neutral principles for
drawing electoral boundaries” and “the absence of rules to limit and
confine judicial intervention.”217  Similarly, another district court
found partisan gerrymandering claims to be justiciable under the
Fourteenth Amendment but applied rational basis review because of
language in Justice Kennedy’s Vieth opinion that “[a] determination
that a gerrymander violates the law must rest on . . . the conclusion
that political classifications, . . . though generally permissible, were
applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate
legislative objective.”218  The district court further noted that “political
216 See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1988).  As Merritt observed:
Some state and local governments have proven themselves formidable
lobbyists and indefatigable litigants.  When the Reagan administration
attacked quotas and other types of affirmative action for minorities, several
states and cities defended those practices in complex lawsuits.  Other states
cooperated with social security beneficiaries to sue the federal government
for benefits denied the physically and mentally impaired.  On the legislative
front, state officials recently pressed federal regulators for more stringent
restrictions on toxic waste sites, hazardous air pollutants, and pesticides. In
both courts and Congress, therefore, states can provide a particularly organ-
ized and effective opposition to federal policies.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
217 Shapiro v. Berger, 328 F. Supp. 2d 496, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
218 Johnson-Lee v. City of Minneapolis, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19708, at *40 (D.
Minn. Sept. 30, 2004) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claim arising
from the redistricting of Minneapolis, Minnesota).
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affiliation is not afforded the same protection as a suspect class or a
fundamental constitutional right.”219  Thus, the splintered opinions in
Vieth have allowed courts to respond favorably to the use of partisan-
ship but make little allowance for the fact that a plan drawn by a redis-
tricting commission could be “unrelated to a legitimate legislative
objective” in a way that undermines the legitimate use of partisanship
in redistricting.  Given the state of the case law, it would be difficult
for a court to articulate a workable standard to review a plan drawn by
independent commissions in order to ensure that the plan does not
impair the ability of states to protect their interests through their
authority over redistricting.  Courts should opt instead to remove
authority over redistricting from independent commissions
altogether.
3. Promoting Partisan Gerrymandering’s Federalism Benefit
through Strong State Political Parties
The argument against redistricting conducted by independent
commissions necessarily requires that the process be left in the hands
of the governing elites; a corollary of this argument is that state politi-
cal parties must be sufficiently independent and autonomous in order
to properly promote the state’s interests through gerrymandering.  As
Larry Kramer observed, political parties connect politicians at every
level of government, but implicit in this observation is that elected
officials at the state and national level are always on one accord and
band together to promote uniform policy.  Contrary to popular belief,
however, state officials often develop their preferences towards federal
regulation as a reaction to solving immediate problems within their
own states.  Consequently, there are instances in which the policy pref-
erences of state parties are distinct from their national counterparts,
and where there is conflict, the federalism benefit of partisan gerry-
mandering can be realized only if there is a strong state party able to
withstand political pressure from the national party to conform to its
policy agenda.220
Weak state parties undermine the ability of states to promote
their interests through partisan gerrymandering for several reasons.
First, the federal government’s willingness to delegate policymaking
authority to the states is often contingent upon the partisan composi-
tion of the state government, which in turn affects the partisan com-
position of its House delegation and what policies the state advocates
219 Id.
220 See, e.g., Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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for at the national level.221  If the national party is in the governing
majority and perceives a state party as being out of line with its plat-
form, it could refuse to delegate policymaking authority to that partic-
ular state.  Only a strong state party, distinct from the national party,
would be able to promote its agenda while navigating any conflicts
with its national counterparts.
The partisan composition of the two levels of government also
influences the extent to which resources are allocated to the states.222
As such, if a state sends a delegation that is as cohesive as possible to
Congress in order to further the goal of creating a political majority,
then they can expect to see substantive gains at the state level if their
party achieves majority status.223  But these gains are arguably contin-
gent on whether the state party is perceived as being in line with the
national platform.  Strong state parties are key to ensuring that the
state still receives these benefits, especially when there is some varia-
tion in the policy positions between state and national parties.
Second, both of the major parties in the state have to be able to
adequately respond to shifting voter preferences within the state in
order to effectively promote the federalism benefits of partisan gerry-
mandering, which may weigh against anti-competitive electoral struc-
tures that marginalize the minor parties in the state, or alternatively,
laws that unduly involve the state in the internal affairs of its political
221 George A. Krause & Ann O’M. Bowman, Adverse Selection, Political Parties, and
Policy Delegation in the American Federal System, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 359, 361 (2005)
(“[N]ational level politicians respond directly to partisan political preferences at the
state level and either consolidate or delegate policymaking authority accordingly.”).
In a recent paper, Chris Elmendorf and David Schleicher argue that differentiation
between state and national parties is also important to address the problem of voter
ignorance, where the uniformity of party labels between state and national parties can
cause voters to “base their decisions in subnational elections on what they know about
the parties’ position-taking and performance at the national level.”  Elmendorf &
Schleicher, Informing Consent, supra note 212 at 5–6 (suggesting that this problem can
be addressed by modifying party labels “to distinguish the party at different levels of
government”).
222 David R. Cameron, The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis,
72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1243, 1248 (1978); see also id. at 1251 (“[P]artisanship of govern-
ment is associated with the rate of expansion.”).
223 Krause & Bowman, supra note 221, at 363 (“[A]n increase in the partisan bal-
ance of national electoral institutions favoring Republicans (Democrats) will result in
less (greater) policy centralization or consolidation by the U.S. federal government
(the top-down partisan hypothesis).”); see also John E. Chubb, The Political Economy of
Federalism, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 994, 1005 (1985) (“Republicans have consistently
favored fewer strings, less federal supervision, and the delegation of spending discre-
tion to the state and local governments, whereas Democrats have advocated the
opposite.”).
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parties.224  As such, the need for strong state parties has implications
for the judicial review of not only partisan gerrymandering claims but
also claims involving disputes between the national political party and
the state,225 and to a lesser extent, the minority political party in the
state and the state.226  For example, where a state party and the state
are at odds, particularly if the party is the minority in the state, this
may indicate not only partisan gridlock, but also an attempt to weaken
one state party at the expense of another.227
In contrast, where the majority state party and national party col-
lide, deference to the state party may be warranted in order to reaf-
firm that they are legally and functionally a separate entity from the
national party.228  For example, in Democratic Party of United States v.
Wisconsin ex. rel. La Follette, the Supreme Court held that the national
Democratic Party’s First Amendment rights were violated when the
election laws of Wisconsin allowed non-Democrats to vote in the Dem-
ocratic primary without regard to party affiliation.  Because national
party rules forbade delegates being chosen by anyone but registered
Democrats, the Wisconsin law forced the national party to associate
with individuals who were not publicly affiliated Democrats.229
In the interest of maintaining strong state parties to promote the
federalism benefits of partisan gerrymandering, however, this case
could have easily come out differently without sacrificing the national
224 See Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reas-
sessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 801 (2000) (“[Excessive state
interference can undermine] party leaders’ ability to broker their influence and nom-
inate candidates that respond to the party’s electoral coalition.”); see also Eu v. San
Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216 (1989) (invalidating state
laws that prohibited political parties from endorsing candidates and that regulated
aspects of their internal affairs).
225 See, e.g., La Follette, 450 U.S. at 107.
226 See, e.g.,  Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 211 (1986) (invalidating
Connecticut’s closed primary law on the grounds that it infringed on the Republican
Party’s freedom to associate with unaffiliated voters); see also Persily & Cain, supra
note 224, at 801 (arguing that Tashjian was decided correctly because, in essence, the
closed primary law weakened the party by “inhibit[ing] the party’s ability to field can-
didates that catered to the needs of the interest groups whose support the party
sought”).
227 See Persily & Cain, supra note 224, at 801; see also Pildes, supra note 22, at 102 R
n.298 (“[Tashjian is a case of] obvious self-entrenchment [in which] the party that
controlled key political institutions refused to change the primary structure in a way
that the outside party believed would make it more competitive.”).
228 See LaRouche v. Fowler, 77 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85 (1999) (“[A] state political party
can at times act as a delegatee of power from its resident state [in a way that the
national party cannot].”).
229 La Follette, 450 U.S. at 107.
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party’s associational interests.  As Justice Powell pointed out in dissent,
unaffiliated voters only associate with the party for purposes of partici-
pating in the primary; the party “remain[s] free to require public affil-
iation from anyone wishing any greater degree of participation in
party affairs.”230  Ultimately, allowing unaffiliated voters to participate
in the primary strengthens the state party’s position for the general
election, one of the few indicators that the state Democratic Party may
have been on board with the open primary, even if its national arm
was not.231  Once we reassess this case with an eye towards increasing
the strength of the state party relative to its national counterpart, it is
easy to see how the Court could have come to the conclusion that the
intrusion on the national party’s First Amendment rights was justified.
Thus, given that the position of the state party can be in tension with
the preferences of the national party, from both a procedural and a
policy standpoint, a strong state party is key in ensuring that the state
can promote its agenda despite the pressure to conform.232
CONCLUSION
Partisan gerrymandering has federalism benefits that have been
ignored by legal scholars and courts alike.  This oversight has
occurred because election law scholars tend to minimize the role of
federalism in analyzing the construction of political institutions and
the behavior of political actors; as a result, they propose legal rules
that are inadequate to capture the dynamic at work.  Similarly, feder-
alism scholars tend to downplay the fact that the judicial review of
politics has federalism implications, often approaching the issue by
concluding that the states’ authority over elections has played a mini-
mal role in protecting their regulatory authority, and saying little
beyond this general observation.  Consequently, these literatures
often talk past each other rather than utilizing the doctrinal tools
available in both areas to analyze complex and multifaceted issues like
gerrymandering.
Partisan gerrymandering can facilitate state-federal relations by
increasing the probability that a state can send a cohesive delegation
to Congress, a delegation that can effectively express the state’s policy
230 Id. at 129–30 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[P]articipation in the caucuses where
delegates are selected is limited to publicly affiliated Democrats.”); cf. Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 482 (1975) (holding that state law violated the Democratic
Party’s freedom of association).
231 La Follette, 450 U.S. at 130 (Powell, J., dissenting).
232 An example of this is the fact that in 2009, Governor Crist, a Republican, sup-
ported the bailout and solicited funds for Florida although all of the Republicans in
Florida’s congressional delegation voted against it. See Davis, supra note 191.
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preferences regarding national legislation.  Increased use of mid-dec-
ade redistricting and at-large voting schemes may be desirable in
order to get an accurate gauge of voter preferences and hold elected
officials accountable when gerrymandering occurs.  Similarly, leaving
redistricting in the hands of strong state parties that are distinct from
their national counterparts, rather than delegating this power to inde-
pendent commissions, is also key to this outcome.  As the 2003 Texas
redistricting illustrates, the Supreme Court cannot articulate rules
that insulate federalism-reinforcing gerrymanders from erroneous
invalidation, but the Court can, through related substantive areas that
implicate redistricting, promote this federalism benefit so that states
can protect their authority in a way that has been constitutionally
mandated—through congressional redistricting.
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